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Abstract 
 
Central Bank communication has become, in the last period, a topic of increased interest 
both in academia, as well as in the process of conducting the monetary policy. This thesis addresses 
the communication of central banking and compares the Czech National Bank’s (CNB) 
communication practices with the ones of the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) for the period of 
2005 – 2010. 
Communication of both central banks is analyzed by compyling a Transparency Index, based 
on a detailed analysis of actual information disclosure by the two banks.  In order to analyze how 
surprising are the monetary policy decisions in the two countries, an investigation about how much 
the short-term money market rates change after the monetary policy decision’s announcement has 
been made. The results of the analyses show that the CNB has achieved almost full transparency in 
2010 in conducting the monetary policy, while the NBM, even though registered a gradual increase 
in its transparency since 2005, still needs to put more effort into improving its communication 
practices. 
The research also reveals that the CNB manages to lower the pace of market surprises related 
to its monetary policy decisions, while in the case of NBM, the money market rates respond little to 
the policy rate changes. Also, in order to show the importance of effective communication for the 
success of the monetary policy, the thesis contains a series of recommendations, based on the Czech 
experience, for a more effective central bank communication in Moldova. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
 
Discussing what have economists learned about monetary policy over the past 50 years, 
Svensson (2008) argues that the institutional framework plays a crucial role for a stable and 
successful monetary policy. After conducting the monetary policy for about 50 years, the 
economists have found that good and stable monetary policy is resting on three pillars: (I) a 
mandate, with priority to price stability (II) independence that is freedom from control or influence 
of politics, and (III) accountability, which ensures that central bankers try to reach the inflation 
target. Monetary economists have found that accountability improves with transparency; it provides 
democratic control of a powerful institution. Credibility and transparency are also very important for 
the efficient implementation and transmission of monetary policy. They are achieved through an 
effective communication of the central banks. The evidence suggests that communication can be an 
important and powerful part of the central bank’s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial 
markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve 
central banks’ macroeconomic objectives (Blinder et al., 2008). 
When the monetary policy objectives and strategies are clear and transparent, the 
communication with the markets is more efficient. Effective communication is a must for the 
monetary policy to be stable and produce the expected effects. Central Bank communication with 
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the markets is an indispensable ingredient in the process of building a reputation for valuing price 
stability.  
There has been a growing consensus among monetary economists that better communication 
about central bank actions is essential in reducing the uncertainty facing economic agents (Jeanneau, 
2009). Successful monetary policy is about shaping market expectations of the future evolution of 
key economic and financial variables (Woodford, 2003). When the market expectations are 
managed, monetary policy affects the economic outcomes and this gives central banks control over 
long-term interest rates and provides an important mechanism for influencing consumption and 
investment (Dincer and Eichengreen, 2009). 
The central bank communication and the channels it chooses to communicate reveals the 
degree of accountability the central bank is willing to impose on itself. It also helps at clarifying if 
the decisions taken by the monetary authorities are in line with the public interest. The level of 
economic development of a country, its economic size or geographical location – will play a role in 
the monetary framework the country will adopt. This monetary framework, will contribute, in turn, 
to determine the main characteristics of the communications strategy the central bank will follow 
(Jeanneau, 2009).  
Transparency and communication are of a particular importance for the central banks that 
implement their monetary policies within the inflation targeting regime. Since 1998, the Czech 
National Bank (CNB) has become one of the most effective central banks in the world regarding the 
communication of the monetary policy. The CNB took serious steps to increase the transparency of 
its policy-making process (Böhm et al., 2009). The CNB website states: “A high degree of 
independence must go hand in hand with a high degree of accountability to the public for fulfilling 
our objectives. We inform the public regularly and openly about our objectives and their fulfillment 
and about our opinions, plans and predictions
1
.” Böhm et al. (2009) mentions that in the last decade, 
the CNB’s efforts to become more transparent in terms of monetary policy decisions and their 
effects on the economy have intensified. Holub (2008) notes, related to the same topic, that during 
the period of 1998 – 2008, the CNB managed to lower the degree of market surprises related to its 
monetary policy decisions. The same author also describes that the CNB uses a wide range of 
communication tools and channels to communicate with the general public. Along with 
communication messages primarily oriented toward the financial markets and analysts, who are the 
                                                          
1
 CNB website. About CNB http://www.cnb.cz/en/about_cnb/mission.html 
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major target group of the CNB’s communication on monetary policy decisions, the CNB reaches 
also the general public – through media articles and perceptions (Böhm et al., 2009). 
The CNB can be taken as an example by other National Banks, which are striving to improve 
their performance in terms of communicating their policy decisions to the public. The National Bank 
of Moldova (NBM) is one of the national banks that since its foundation in 1991 – did not put too 
much effort in communicating to the public. When comparing the communications tools used by the 
CNB to inform the Czech people about its monetary policy decisions – with the ones of the NBM, it 
has to be stated that the NBM practice is poorer in the variety and diversity of channels used. The 
NBM has started to review its communication strategy just beginning with 2010. Namely the gap in 
the communication strategies and practices between these two central banks has driven the interest 
of studying the Czech experience with regard to its communication strategy and effort to increase 
transparency of its actions and compare it to the Moldovan experience. This thesis tries to give 
advice to the NBM how to proceed in terms of enhancing its transparency and communication 
strategies based on the CNB’s experience.  
The transparency index constructed both for the CNB and the NBM revealed that the two 
central banks have moved in the direction of greater transparency in the period of 2005 – 2010. 
Moreover, analyzing the monetary policy surprises in the two countries based on how much do 
short-term money market rates change after the decision’s announcement, it has been found the 
CNB surprises the markets less often through decision announcements than the NBM does. Based 
on the Czech experience, recommendations like organizing press conferences after each monetary 
policy meeting or being more prompt when announcing the policy rate decisions have been 
suggested to the NBM, in order to support it in improving the monetary policy transparency, 
clearness and predictability.  
In what follows, papers written on central bank transparency and communication strategies 
are reviewed, followed by general characteristics of each central bank. The methodology of the 
thesis is described, and the transparency index of the CNB and NBM is then constructed. The 
predictability of monetary policy decisions is analyzed in both countries, based on the movements of 
short-term money market rates after the decision’s announcement. The last chapters of the thesis 
present several recommendations to the NBM to improve its communication strategies. The overall 
findings of the thesis are then gathered in the conclusion.    
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Chapter 2 
2. Literature Review 
 
The increasing emphasis on communication in monetary policy has resulted in a growing 
amount of research in this area over the last decade. 
In the paper “Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Update”, Dincer & 
Eichengreen (2009) argue that central banks are supposed to be opened about their objectives, 
outlooks, policy strategies, and even their mistakes. The authors argue that nowadays, there is a 
move in the direction of policy transparency and they are interested to find out what lies behind the 
trend. One aspect for which the above mentioned paper is important for this research is the analysis 
that the authors make of the determinants of the degree of transparency, focusing on the role of 
political variables. They construct a transparency index, which captures the political, economic, 
procedural, policy and operational aspects of monetary policy transparency. The authors have 
constructed the index for 100 central banks from 1998 through 2006. According to their study, the 
most transparent central banks in 2006 were the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish 
Riksbank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the Czech National Bank, the ECB, and the 
Central Bank of the Hungary. The authors conclude that a large number of central banks have 
moved in the direction of greater transparency in recent years. Their analysis suggests also that 
central bank transparency has a favorable impact on inflation variability, but less evidence of an 
impact on inflation persistence. 
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Another paper that constructs a transparency index is the one of Eijffinger & Geraats (2005), 
who propose an index for the transparency of monetary policy that takes into account the 
procedural, political, economic, operational and policy aspects of central banking. Transparency of 
central banks has become a topic of public and academic debate on monetary policy. However, this 
topic encounters pitfalls, as transparency is hard to be measured, because it is a qualitative concept. 
The index proposed by Eijffinger & Geraats (2005) is based on information gathered from nine 
central Banks from 1998 until 2002. The findings of the paper reveal that the most transparent 
central banks in the sample data are the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank and 
the Bank of England. Another important finding is that although the most transparent central banks 
– target inflation, this monetary policy framework is not a necessary or a sufficient condition for 
transparency. The authors claim that an important advantage of this transparency index is its theory-
consistent framework that distinguishes various aspects of transparency based on the role that 
information plays in the monetary decision making process. Also, the index makes it possible to 
identify how greater transparency manifests itself over time. 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has conducted in 2007 a survey on the 
communication practices of 32 members of the Central Bank Governance Network. Jeanneau (2009) 
reveals and comments the results of the survey in the paper “Communication of monetary policy 
decisions by central banks: what is revealed and why.” Lately, central banks have focused their 
efforts to improve the way they communicate with the public. The information is more 
comprehensible and is provided on a timelier basis. Central banks improved their communication 
strategies in order to guarantee better accountability; to enhance the public understanding of the 
objectives of monetary policy and to guide market expectations. Some central banks are coupling 
the short statements explaining the reasons for policy actions with documents containing a forecast. 
Through public appearances of senior officials or through official publications, the central banks 
also comment on the evolution of the economy in general. The paper also refers to the fact that 
central banks operating under inflation targeting frameworks tend to provide more information than 
the ones operating under other frameworks. Another finding of the survey is that central banks in 
developed countries tend to disclose more information than developing countries’ national banks. 
The author suggests that regardless of the progress made in communicating to markets, central 
banks should also put efforts in educating the general public about monetary policy, as an earlier 
14 
 
internal BIS survey on the public image of central banks revealed that there is little improvement in 
the public’s confidence and understanding of the central banks’ functions.  
Eusepi & Preston (2007) analyze the importance of communication in the implementation of 
monetary policy.  They state that the central bank is unsure about the current state of the economy. 
Economic agents lack the information about the values of the aggregate variables, like nominal 
interest rates, and must learn about their behavior using historical data. The authors argue that due to 
these uncertainties, when the central bank implements an optimal monetary policy, the Taylor 
principle is not sufficient for macroeconomic stability and for anchoring agents’ expectations. In 
order to balance the instability, they analyze three communication strategies: (1) when the central 
bank communicates the precise details of the monetary policy and explains the variables and 
coefficients; (2) when it communicates only the variables on which monetary policy decisions are 
based; and (3) when the central bankers communicate the inflation target. The findings of the paper 
show that the first two communication strategies reinstate the Taylor principle as a sufficient 
condition for stabilizing expectations. However, in economies where the economic shocks appear to 
be constant, communicating the inflation target does not protect against expectations driven 
fluctuations. The authors conclude that if a central bank wants to stabilize expectations, it has to 
communicate the precise details of the monetary policy and explain the variables and coefficients, 
i.e. the systematic component of monetary policy strategy. Just announcing an inflation target is not 
enough – they must also announce how this target will be achieved. 
Woodford (2005) stresses that “before the 1990s, central banking was shrouded in mystery.” 
Speaking about the Federal Reserve, the author states that one of the most important changes at the 
American Central Bank during the period when Alan Greenspan was a Chairman of the Board of 
Governors, has been the increase in the FOMC’s readiness to talk openly about the policy decisions 
that it has made and those coming in the future. He notes that until the beginning of the Greenspan 
era, central bankers guarded the “mystique" of central banking as they believed it was essential to 
their success. The author also notes that FOMC’s openness toward communicating the path of future 
policy has increased the ability of agents to anticipate the Federal Reserve’s policy. He also 
concludes that this development lead to FOMC being able to achieve the effects on the economy 
that it desires, by keeping the expectations of market participants harmonized with its own. Despite 
greater transparency and increased central bank communication, many central banks are still 
uncertain about how a bank's own view of the likely future path of interest rates should be 
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communicated. According to the author’s view, in the case of inflation-forecast targeting central 
banks, their way of conducting the monetary policy and in particular, the way they will 
communicate with the public their monetary policy decisions will make these banks to base the 
projections that are at the heart of their public explanation of their policy decisions on an explicit 
model of their own likely future approach to policy. Moreover, the author states the success of the 
monetary policy the central bank approves depends on the communication strategy that a central 
bank embraces. “Central banking is not like steering an oil tanker, or even guiding a spacecraft, 
which follows a trajectory that depends on constantly changing factors, but that does not depend on 
the vehicle's own expectations about where it is heading.” The conclusion of the paper is that the 
challenge of the Federal Reserve in coming years remains finding an efficient channel of 
communicating with the markets about the future conduct of policy.  
Holmes (2009) in an interesting essay, introduces the notion of “the economy of words”, 
referring to the way central banks around the world express linguistically economic factors and 
measurement coefficients. The author believes that words have the crucial function of creating 
context, of giving a meaning to data series, statistical measures, and econometric projections. 
Moreover, words are used not only to express interpretative accounts or commentaries: “they create 
the economy itself as a communicative field and as an empirical fact.” The current financial crisis 
stresses the role the communication practices play in formulating the monetary policy that would 
influence the severity and the duration of the economic meltdown.  
Fracasso et al. (2005) focus on the inflation targeting central banks and analyze their 
practices of writing and compiling inflation reports. The authors establish a set of best practice 
criteria for inflation reports. They state that the key advantage of inflation targeting is that monetary 
policy is guided by a simple criterion: the gap between forecasted and target inflation. However, it is 
difficult to communicate this gap, as the inflation forecast must be unanimously perceived as 
committing the decision-taking committee to a particular policy decision, so it must be of the best 
quality. Also, the policy response to a given gap is not unique, as it depends on the policy-makers’ 
preferences, the impact of monetary policy on output growth and unemployment, and the existing or 
future economic conditions. The authors state that “inflation targeting is a precise framework with 
imprecise policy implications, and to be understood and generally accepted, it needs to be 
accompanied by clear and precise communication.” Even though inflation targeting central banks 
use a variety of communication tools, such as press releases, press conferences, written documents 
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and websites – Inflation Reports have become the central element of communication of these central 
banks. The authors’ position is that the Inflation Reports establish the bank's expertise in the area of 
inflation and monetary policy, that is why they must present the inputs into decisions (data, 
forecasts, and analyses), the decision-making process itself, and the possible risks associated with 
the chosen policy. Every Inflation Report, in order to be authoritative, must address issues related to 
the objectives of policy, the decision-making process and how conflicting objectives are treated; it 
must be aware of the analytical framework and information on which policies are based; an 
evaluation of past forecasts and policy performance, compared with the current forecast. More 
specifically, the Inflation Report must include output and the labor market observations, monetary 
and financial developments, and foreign conditions. Important components for a successful Inflation 
Report are the clarity of presentation and consistency over time. The authors also state that “good” 
Inflation Reports lead to a better understanding of monetary policy decisions.  
Bernanke (2004) states that over the past fifteen years, Central Banks have become more 
open and transparent: new communication strategies have been adopted by policymaking 
committees to enhance their information sharing with the public (more informative policy 
announcements, post-meeting press conferences, expanded testimony before the legislative bodies, 
the publication of the minutes of policy meetings, and the regular publication of reports on monetary 
policy and the economy). Even though the increased openness is a welcome development, the 
Federal Reserve Chairman argues that the Fed should be as explicit as possible about its policy 
objectives. The author argues that without clear information about policy objectives, the public’s 
problem of predicting future monetary policy actions becomes more difficult and the ineffective 
information provided may do more harm than good to the economy. 
Mohan (2009) believes that, after the financial crisis, the task of central banks has become 
more complex, as along with the objective of inflation targeting and economic growth, central banks 
have another objective, and namely maintaining the financial stability. The author believes that the 
more complex the mandate of central banks – the more important the role of communication. He 
describes the Reserve Bank of India, which has such a complex task and that requires 
comprehensible communication strategy with financial markets and the general public. The bank 
employs such communication strategies as policy announcements, reports, regulatory 
communications, technical advisory committees, and interactions with the media. The central bank’s 
website is used to maintain transparency in operations. Even though the bank uses these 
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communication channels, is it still difficult for the bank to maintain effective communication. The 
author believes that there was little understanding of the Indian Reserve Bank’s actions as it directed 
its actions to curb financial excesses before the financial crisis. The conclusion of the paper is that 
complexity of policy statements puts a lot of barriers in the process of communication and makes 
the delivery of the message to the public more difficult. Also, policy statements that are more 
complex are often regarded as non-transparent, because the public, markets and analysts are used to 
receive simpler objectives and statements from the central bank. This makes the author to conclude 
that simplicity is now confused with transparency and as a result, central banks will face new 
communication challenges in the near future.  
More authors argue about the benefits and costs of transparency and state that transparency 
is beneficial for society. Several authors (Dillén & Nilsson, 1998; Saxton, 1997; Mishkin, 2004; 
Nijathaworn, 2006), discuss the advantages and costs for a transparent monetary policy. Dillén & 
Nilsson, (1998) are of the opinion that namely non-central bankers argue that transparency is 
beneficial for society. Mishkin (2004) and Nijathaworn (2006) argue that transparency increases 
public support for central bank policies which is essential for winning central bank independence. 
Dillén & Nilsson (1998) and Saxton (1997) state that a transparent monetary policy: 
a) Enhances central bank credibility – a high degree of transparency makes the central bank to be more 
accountable of its actions, as well as increases the credibility of monetary policy.  As central banks 
care about their reputation, they will carefully choose the tools and messages sent to the public. 
They will tend to communicate more, as it is more costly to cheat the public with surprise inflation 
(Dillén & Nilsson, 1998). Saxton (1997) believes also that enhanced credibility allows expectations 
to fine-tune faster with respect to changes in monetary policy, promoting more flexibility in labor 
markets and lowering employment and output costs of disinflation. The same author also believes 
that in this way, price stability can more easily be achieved, handles, and preserved. 
b) Clarifies policy objectives – A more open and straightforward monetary policy process creates 
powerful incentives for monetary authorities to vigilantly describe the primary objectives of 
monetary policy. This, in turn, creates incentives to keep attention focused on such goals as well as 
to adopt procedures, indicators, and instruments that would maximize the chances of achieving these 
objectives (Saxton, 1997). 
c) Improves the workings and usefulness of financial markets – unlike Dillén & Nilsson (1998), Saxton 
(1997) believes that if a central bank provides complete and timely information on its policy 
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decisions, the volatility of financial markets decreases significantly. Financial markets are in a better 
position when inflation objectives are clear and provided on time, accompanied by detailed 
information. Also, more information gives the private sector the chance to adjust expectations faster 
to changes in monetary policy. This in turn, allows the economic agents to circulate the information 
faster and minimize the disorder of policy change. Saxton (1997) also states that as the uncertainties 
premiums are reduced, interest rates will be lower, strengthening bond and equity markets. This 
whole process leads to improvement of the information content of financial market prices, and as a 
result these prices become very useful in conveying market sensitive information. 
d) Minimizes the chances policymakers would manipulate policy for political purposes – Saxton (1997) 
is of the opinion that a more transparent monetary policy diminishes policymakers’ initiatives to 
manipulate the monetary policy for political purposes. If the policy goals and procedures are open 
and well-known, private analysts and financial markets will be able to monitor the central banks’ 
actions and detect any manipulation of monetary policy for political purposes. In this way, markets 
can promptly react to such manipulation and can right away revise inflation expectations. Thus, 
everyone would be able to see these actions and the central bankers would not have the opportunity 
to surprise the markets with stimulative policy. 
e) Works to improve monetary policy – both Dillén & Nilsson (1998) and Saxton (1997) even though 
call this advantage in a different way; categorize it as incentives for central bankers to improve their 
forecast and analysis. A transparent monetary policy would foster the private sector analysts to 
openly discuss and criticize central bankers’ actions, procedures, and justification. Such criticism, in 
turn, would force the authorities to defend their policy objectives, procedures, and decisions and 
thus urge the central bank to draw its analysis as accurate as possible. The competition of ideas and 
the open dialogue would lead to a monetary policy that accounts for all the participants in the 
process. 
Malik & Din (2008) state that central banks’ transparency is of a particular importance for 
developing countries, because in these countries wrong perceptions and lack of knowledge about 
monetary policy issues and implementation – are widely common. The authors believe that an 
important benefit in this context is that transparency can educate people about what monetary policy 
can and cannot do and as a consequence avoid the criticism on the monetary authorities. Another 
benefit of transparency for developing countries is the encouragement of public dialogue on policy 
issues that can be involved in bringing central bank policies in line with public’s desires. Even a 
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more important benefit is that “a transparent monetary policy is fundamental for enforcing fiscal 
discipline on governments that rely heavily on seignorage revenues to meet budgetary deficiencies.” 
A final point stated by Malik & Din (2008) is that monetary policy transparency can allow the 
public to compare central bank performance with international best practices of central banks, and as 
a consequence can make the public to put pressure on the central banks to adopt these best practices 
at whatever time the performance of the central bank does not comply with the internationally 
accepted benchmarks. 
Along with these advantages, Dillén & Nilsson (1998) research the sources of possible costs 
associated with a transparent monetary policy. The authors distinguish between social costs and 
central bank costs. Referring to central bank costs: 
a) Goal differences – Dillén & Nilsson (1998) explain the case when the central bank’s goal, which is 
usually kept secret from the general public, differs from the objective of society. They give the 
example when the central bank has a different short-run employment target. In this case, a high 
degree of transparency reduces the central bank’s possibility of attaining its own goal, which is a 
cost for the central bank.  
b) Resources – Dillén & Nilsson (1998) refer to this type of cost as to a pragmatic aspect. When the 
central bank decides to embrace a transparent monetary policy, it has to offer more resources to 
produce inflation reports, to give speeches, to organize press conferences, which all refers to 
communicating with the public. The social costs: 
c) Cost of changing view – Dillén & Nilsson (1998) believe that if the central bank’s view of the 
economy is publicly presented to the public and after a while it has to be changed, this revision is 
more costly in terms of efficiency losses under a transparent policy. The authors believe that first of 
all, a change of the central bank’s view may make the public think that the central bank is 
unqualified to make the policy and lead to criticism. Even if this criticism is unfair, it can negatively 
affect the central bank’s credibility. The second aspect of these costs the authors are describing, 
relates to the fact that a transparent policy influences economic agent’s behavior through 
expectations. In the case the central bank gains later new information that can change its view of the 
current state of the economy and as a result intends to change its monetary policy, this may cause 
costs in terms of efficiency, as there can arise changes in the economic agents’ behavior. Said it 
differently – transparency can direct to changes in private agents’ behavior that afterwards appear to 
be detrimental. 
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d) Short-run expectation effects – central bank’s transparency about its aims and analysis, which are 
based on some beliefs of how agents’ expectations are formed, may influence agents’ expectations 
and behavior in ways that deteriorate the strength of the analysis. Dillén & Nilsson (1998) state that 
even though in the long run, gains from a high degree of transparency usually dominate, it is 
important to be aware of these short-run costs. 
There is also an important stream of literature, which warns that there are some limits to 
Central Banks’ transparency. Even if central bank transparency improves efficiency and 
accountability, some authors wonder whether central bank transparency can go too far (Dincer & 
Eichengreen, 2009). The same authors state that the European Central Bank has explained its refusal 
to publish the minutes and voting records of its board because individual members might become 
subject to pressure from special interests (like national interests) that might compromise their 
independence and lead to inefficient policy decisions. 
Amato et al. (2002) in their paper “Communication and Monetary Policy” state that there are 
three factors due to which the central banks have decided to vociferate their decisions to the public: 
a higher degree of independence granted to too many central banks, which has been accompanied by 
a need for increased accountability. This accountability refers to the fact that the central bank’s 
decisions and beliefs need to be communicated to the general public, so that the performance of the 
monetary policy makers could be fairly evaluated. Another factor that had made central banks to 
increase the information provided to the public is the adoption of inflation targeting as a monetary 
policy objective by many industrialized and emerging market countries with New Zealand, 
introducing it as the first country in 1990. The adoption by central banks of formal and specific 
inflation targets has placed unprecedented emphasis on the communication strategies and practices 
of central banks. The third factor improving central bank communication is the growing importance 
of financial markets in many countries. Since market prices are driven by the expectations of market 
participants, shaping and managing these expectations is an important task of monetary policy. 
Anchoring agents’ expectations is done through effective communication strategies with market 
participants. The authors also argue that the nature of public information when used for policy 
purposes is double-edged. It is true that the public information is effective at influencing the actions 
of agents, but the problem is that sometimes it is too effective in doing so. Usually, firms and 
households react excessively to public information and if the public news is not correct or is 
mistaken – its disclosure causes more damage than good. This conclusion was later on disputed by 
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Svensson (2005), who states that the main findings of Amato et al. (2002) have been initially 
presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result, however some scrutiny of the result shows 
that it is actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances, more public information is 
good. Furthermore, the same author notes that for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in 
public and private information, social welfare is higher than in a situation without public 
information. 
 Blinder et al. (2008) define central bank communication as the provision of information by 
the central bank to the public regarding such matters as the objectives of monetary policy, the 
monetary policy strategy, the economic outlook, and the outlook for future policy decisions. The 
authors argue that central bank communication has become a worldwide phenomenon in the last 
decade. Surveying the literature on central bank communication, they have found out that in some 
cases central bank communications create news. This happens when the central bank’s 
announcements influence expectations and therefore move asset prices. There are even extreme 
situations, when communication, used to influence market expectations, may even become the main 
tool of monetary policy. There are also studies that analyze how central bank communication 
reduces noise. This arises when central bank pronouncements increase the predictability of central 
bank actions, which would in turn reduce volatility in financial markets. Nevertheless, the authors 
also argue that poorly designed or poorly executed communications can do more harm than good to 
the economy that is why central banks put limits to their communications. That is why some central 
banks have a blackout period before each policy meeting. This is done so as to prevent any 
misunderstanding by the public of the monetary policy announcements. Another problem that the 
authors point out is when monetary policy decisions are announced by a committee rather than by a 
single person: the “cacophony problem.” Too many voices might confuse rather than enlighten the 
public – especially if the messages are conflicting. However, the authors point out that the remedy 
for this problem is clarity, and not silence.  
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) investigate how effective are the different communication 
strategies of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank. The authors 
analyze the content, timing and consistency of the communication statements by the central banks’ 
committees and their individual members as well as their voting behavior. They argue that the three 
central banks are following different communication strategies: the Federal Reserve is pursuing a 
more individualistic communication strategy. There is dispersion in what the individual Federal 
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Open Market Committee (FOMC) members say, as they often tend to be more outspoken and most 
often provide more biased statements. On contrary, the majority of ECB Governing Council 
members voice out statements that are more neutral. Also, the Bank of England and the ECB have 
been conducting a more collegiate communication strategy and the degree of consistency among the 
committee members is much higher. The main finding of the paper is that there is not a single best 
approach to central bank communication, the best communication strategy depends on the 
circumstances and the environment a central bank operates in. 
The same authors continue their research and analyze in another paper on how central banks 
should communicate. By comparing again communication policies by the Federal Reserve, the Bank 
of England and the ECB since 1999 until 2004, the authors conclude that, for all these central banks, 
a higher degree of dispersion in the communication about the monetary policy future path by 
committee members worsens the ability of financial markets to anticipate future monetary policy 
decisions and raises the degree of market uncertainty. This effect is significant, accounting for about 
one third to one half of the market’s prediction errors of the FOMC monetary policy decisions since 
1999. Although it is found to be the case only for the Federal Reserve, communicating the risks and 
variety of views regarding the economic stance enhances the financial markets’ ability to anticipate 
the future path of interest rates. Moreover, the authors have found that the balance-of-risk 
assessment provided by the FOMC since May 1999 has helped markets anticipate the future path of 
interest rates. Also, a higher frequency of communication also tends to help markets predict future 
monetary policy decisions. These divergent findings regarding the dispersed communication suggest 
some policy implications and namely that central banks should distinguish between the way they 
communicate the monetary policy tendency and the economic stance. The authors conclude that it is 
the collegiality of views on monetary policy but the diversity of views on the economic outlook that 
appear to enhance the effectiveness of central bank communication and policy making  (Ehrmann & 
Fratzscher, 2005). 
Demertzis & Viegi (2008) in the paper “Matching” Expectations to the Target: The Role of 
Communication in Monetary Policy” explain the conditions under which central bank 
communications are important while the public forms its inflation expectations. When the private 
sector is expecting a certain level of inflation, it is easier for the Central Bank to achieve its inflation 
objective. The authors introduce the term information game: the public forms their expectation 
“based on all information available, but is also subject to the existing information noise”. They 
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argue that in order for the public to form correct expectations – the target announced by the Central 
Bank has to be sufficiently credible. The authors believe that credibility and expectations are 
strongly tied to the target, and successful monetary policy is linked to inflation. An important input 
of the paper is to explain the Central Bank’s credibility. The authors explain how credibility can be 
gained but can also be lost: this depends on both Central Bank actions but also the shocks that hit the 
economy. It is easier to increase credibility when good conditions prevail while it also easier to lose 
it in bad economic conditions. Another important key of the paper is the proof that having an anchor 
for expectations can improve Central Bank’s credibility and, by implication, contribute to the 
achievement of objectives more often than otherwise. The final point of the paper is that a well-
defined communication framework, together with favorable circumstances – helps at fortifying 
credibility “but without totally sealing the Central Bank’s reputation from adverse circumstances”. 
Filardo & Guinigundo (2008) explore the nature of Central Bank transparency and 
communication strategies in the context of Asian-Pacific central banks. They argue that despite the 
sophisticated set of communication strategies that emerged in the last decade and the policymakers’ 
efforts to communicate policy-relevant information to financial markets, the media and the public at 
large in that region, there are concerns regarding the way communication strategies of the central 
banks in the region should be improved. The authors believe that increasing the level of economic 
literacy of the population at large would be an important contribution in helping central banks better 
communicate with the public. Moreover, Central Banks should study what, how, and to what extent 
they should communicate with the public in the future. The authors also warn about the importance 
to know whether additional information provided by central bankers would improve the public’s 
understanding of the central banks’ objectives, economic assessments or would worsen the future 
economic conditions. 
Blinder (2008) strongly advocates that Central Bank communication is needed for 
democratic accountability and for the effectiveness of monetary policy. Meanwhile, the author 
notifies that unclear communication is one source (but not the only one) of uncertainty in central 
bank communication. Other sources of uncertainty refer to inconsistent signals that arise when 
different members of a monetary policy committee express different messages – intentionally (by 
participating at public debates) or unintentionally (when the communication is uncoordinated among 
members of the committee). Another important point that the author makes is that central bank 
communication must have both a “transmitter” and a “receiver.” He states that confusion with 
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regard to the message transmitted by the Central Bank can originate either from the transmitter or 
from the receiver of the information. On the receiving end, the same message might be interpreted 
differently by different listeners, who may have different expectations or believe in different models. 
The author provides one example (using survey data) showing that the same inflation report is 
perceived differently by different respondents, and that interest rate surprises tend to increase with 
the divergence in perceptions. 
Another author that warns there are some limits to transparency is Cukierman (2009), who 
argues that, due to limited knowledge about the economy, even central banks that are considered to 
be very transparent with regard to their monetary policy – are sometimes ambiguous about their 
measurement of the output gap and about their viewpoints regarding the effect of policy on 
inflationary expectations. Another idea launched by the author is that no Central Bank has made 
clear statements about its objective function, including in particular the relative weight on output 
versus inflation stabilization, the policy discount factor and the shape of losses from the inflation 
and the output gaps over the possible ranges of realizations of those variables. The paper also argues 
that there is a trade-off between full transparency and full utilization of information in setting policy 
because when a Central Bank is too transparent – the political pressures on that Central Bank may 
be intensified.  
  Clare & Courtenay (2001) argue that minutes describing controversial discussion among 
central bank board members can intensify asset price volatility. Their conclusion was that too much 
information only confuses investors and analysts. 
Finally, there are also several papers focusing specifically on the Czech National Bank’s 
communications strategies, which is the subject of this thesis (while the  literature on National Bank 
of Moldova’s communication is completely missing). Rozkrut et al. (2005) analyze the 
communications strategies of the Czech National Bank (CNB) Central Bank of Hungary (MNB) and 
National Bank of Poland (NBP). The paper answers from the empirical point of view the question of 
whether the communication strategies of these central banks send relevant information to market 
participants and whether it influences their behavior. The authors measure the reaction of several 
financial variables in periods when official monetary policy statements take place (such as 
communiqués, inflation reports or minutes, central bank verbal comments, decisions on interest 
rates), so as to assess the effectiveness of these policies. The assessment is made based on a database 
of policy makers’ verbal comments. The findings of the paper suggest that even though these three 
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central banks pursue the same monetary policy, and namely are targeting inflation, they have 
adopted different communication styles. First of all, while the CNB statements are more balanced 
and more consistent with Board Members’ prospective decisions on interest rates, the Hungarian 
and Polish central banks seem to misguide the markets, as there is a strong high inflation and 
positive economic outlook bias in the NBP and, to some extent, in the MNB communication. These 
findings suggest that the communication of the CNB is the most efficient one, while the MNB and 
the NBP send messages that tend to misguide the markets. Investigating whether central bank “talk” 
influences market expectations of future policy decisions, the authors find out that in the Czech 
Republic, the central bank messages are most influential when statements about monetary policy 
inclinations are made during the Board conference. However, testing whether central banks have 
any influence on the predictability of interest rate decisions, the authors conclude that that central 
bank statements have not yet helped to increase predictability of monetary policy decisions and to 
reduce the surprise component of monetary policy decisions in these three countries. Authors’ 
hypothesis is that either markets are not very efficient in processing signals sent by central banks or 
policy-makers’ actions are not consistent with their preceding messages. Another explanation is that 
there are not yet developed efficient communication strategies in these countries. So the authors’ 
urge for these three monetary authorities is to pay more attention to the way they convey their 
intentions and information to the public. This would lead to the improvement of central bank 
credibility and thus increase its communication power. 
Bulíř et al. (2007) analyze the CNB’s most frequent communication tools to evaluate the 
clarity of its communication. The paper compares the messages contained in three communication 
tools: inflation targets, verbal assessments of inflation factors contained in quarterly inflation reports 
and inflation forecasts, and concludes that the information from the above mentioned tools is clear 
and offers a reliable message to the public. The paper states that inflation targeting allows for a 
healthy perception of monetary policy decisions and thus contributes to anchoring inflation 
expectations. Analyzing the inflation forecasts from the quarterly reports, the authors have found 
that in case of unanticipated shocks, the central bank constantly communicates economic 
developments and its own policy response. Thus, the public anticipated the eventual inflation 
outturn in a correct way.  
Filáček et al. (2007) study the arguments in favor of and against the decision of publishing 
interest rates forecast by central banks. Using the experience of four central banks: the Reserve 
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Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank, Sveriges Riksbank which publish, and Banco de la República 
Colombia – which used to publish interest rates forecast in the past, the authors try to review the 
pros and cons and to evaluate the CNB’s ability to increase its transparency, accountability and 
credibility through publishing of its interest rates forecasts. The authors argue that in countries with 
inflation-targeting regime, central banks’ transparency is of special interest, as the monetary policy 
conducted by central banks is dependent on the market perception of its policy decisions and the 
way it is communicated. This is because longer-term interest rates given by market expectations of 
future monetary policy are the factor that plays a role in the actual decision-making of economic 
agents. Namely these longer-term rates contribute to the macroeconomic outcomes the central bank 
aims to influence. The paper also argues that the publication of forecasts for the policy interest rate 
is a further step towards greater openness and clarity in central banks’ communication and this is 
namely because the monetary policy makers manages to influence agents’ expectations.  When 
discussing the pros of publishing the interest rate forecast, the authors say that it helps reduce 
uncertainty for other decision-makers, it enhances the credibility of the monetary policy, it improves 
the co-ordination of macroeconomic policies and it helps a central bank to follow a consistent 
strategy. An argument against publishing the future interest rate path is that it may influence the 
actions of economic agents and if the agents over-react to public information, a central bank’s 
imperfect judgment on the future interest rates will cause damage to the market participants. The 
authors conclude that once the CNB publishes the numerical values of its interest rate forecasts, the 
CNB will be able to influence the market expectations. 
Böhm et al. (2009) in the paper from the Czech National Bank (CNB) working series 
“Perception is Always Right: The CNB’s Monetary Policy in the Media”, analyze the Czech 
media’s perception about the central bank’s monetary policy decisions in the period of 2002–2007. 
The paper states that it is important to assess media’s awareness of the central bank’s policy, as the 
general public is following mass media’s highlights in the everyday life, and thus is indirectly 
reached by the bank through the media. The authors assessed media’s opinion vis-à-vis the CNB’s 
decisions using a set of articles published in the four most relevant Czech daily broadsheets 
immediately after monetary policy meetings. The findings of the paper are that unlike the 
professional audience (markets, analysts), which is directly influenced by the announcements made 
by the central bank and by its decisions, the media is in general indifferent to the fact that the CNB 
surprises the market from time to time with its interest rate decisions. Mass media writes more 
27 
 
sophisticated and longer articles when the CNB changes interest rates. Also, the pathos of the media 
articles is more evident when it comes to announcements about accelerating GDP growth or about 
rising inflation. In 2008, the CNB decided to start publishing the forecasted path of nominal 
exchange rate. In this context, announcements about the appreciation of the koruna exchange rate – 
are negatively perceived in the media. 
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Chapter 3 
3. Main characteristics of the Central Banks 
 
3.1 Czech National Bank 
 
The Czech National Bank is the central bank of the Czech Republic and the institution performing 
financial market supervision (Act on the CNB). The supreme governing body of the CNB is 
the Bank Board, consisting of the CNB Governor, two Vice-Governors and four Chief Executive 
Directors. All Bank Board members are appointed by the President of the Czech Republic for a term 
of six years.  
As of January 1998, the monetary policy regime of the CNB is inflation targeting (Šmídkova 
& Hrnčíř, 1998). In order to create conditions for sustainable economic growth, the CNB focuses on 
creating a low-inflation environment in the economy that is achieving and maintaining price 
stability. Without affecting its primary objective of maintaining price stability, the CNB also 
supports the general economic policies of the Government.
2
 
In accordance with its primary objective, the CNB: 
 sets the monetary policy; 
                                                          
2
 CNB website About the CNB. http://www.cnb.cz/en/about_cnb/ When writing this section of the paper, the CNB 
website was accessed during November 25 – November 30, 2010.  
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 issues banknotes and coins and;  
 manages the circulation of currency, the payment system and settlement between banks.  
It also performs supervision of the banking sector, the capital market, the insurance industry, 
pension funds, credit unions and electronic money institutions, as well as foreign exchange 
supervision. As a central bank the CNB provides banking services to the state and the public sector.  
Holub (2008) states that the CNB has a wide range of communication channels, through which 
the bank strives to communicate to the public the monetary policy decisions: 
 Immediate press release with the decision; 
 Press conference after the Monetary Policy meeting with questions and answers session; 
 A regular newspaper article about the forecast; 
 Minutes of the Bank Board meeting. The voting ratio started to be published since 2001, and  
the names since 2008; 
 Inflation reports describing the forecast with a verbal comment on the interest rate path since 
2002, and numerically since 2008; 
 Publishing the exchange rate path for CZK/EUR since 2009; 
 Full transcript of discussions and situational reports published after 6 years. This practice has 
for the first time started in 2008; 
 Press release commenting the monthly inflation figures, including forecast errors and the 
quarterly GDP figures; 
 All strategic monetary policy documents are published;  
 Publication of monthly volumes of Forex trading 
The same author also notes that a volume evaluating the first 10 years if inflation targeting was 
prepared and also a book on the CNB's forecasting process was published. 
CNB (2010) informs about improvements in the quarterly inflation reports publication that 
were introduced in the third quarter of 2010. Changes in the content have been introduced, 
consisting in the merger of the inflation report with a non-public document called the Situation 
Report on Economic and Monetary Developments. This improvement was done in order to create a 
single document discussed by the Bank Board and serving as a baseline for its monetary policy 
decisions as well as for public communication. With these changes, the inflation report offers to the 
public not only a more detailed description of the CNB's new macroeconomic forecast and a 
comparison between it and the previous forecast. It also provides sensitivity and/or alternative 
30 
 
scenarios which quantify the risks to the baseline scenario of the forecast and which might influence 
the Bank Board's monetary policy decisions.  
 
3.2 National Bank of Moldova  
 
The National Bank of Moldova (NBM) is the central bank of the Republic of Moldova and 
exercises its attributions as a legal, public, autonomous person responsible to the Parliament (Law 
on the NBM, 2006). The NBM was set in 1991. The fundamental objective of the National Bank is 
the maintenance and the ensuring of price stability. It is governed by a Council of administration 
made up of five members. The term of each member of the Council of Administration shall be 7 
years (Law on the NBM, 2006).  
According to the NBM official website, the NBM is responsible for: 
 formulating, implementing and promoting the monetary and foreign exchange policy;  
 acting as the banker of the country;  
 regulating the activity of financial institutions; 
 supervising the payment system and facilitating the functioning of the interbank payment 
system; 
 issuing the domestic currency; 
 establishing, through consultations with the Government, the foreign exchange regime of the 
national currency; 
 managing foreign the exchange reserves of the state; 
As mentioned in the beginning, the NBM uses much less communications channels to inform the 
public about its monetary policy decisions, when compared to the CNB. The NBM has started to 
review its communication strategy just beginning from 2010, when it has introduced changes in its 
monetary policy strategy for the 2010 – 2012 period of time. First of all, the NBM Council of 
Administration will meet to discuss the monetary policy issues each month.  The second day after 
this meeting, the monetary policy decisions will be published. Also, after the National Bureau of 
Statistics publishes the consumer prices index, the NBM will publish on a monthly basis a press 
release where the determinants of inflation will be analyzed and an assessment of the forecast on 
inflation will be carried out. The Monetary Policy Report will be published quarterly, which will 
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include an analysis of the macroeconomic situation and a forecast for the medium term (2 years) of 
inflation and of the main macroeconomic indicators (NBM, 2010). The first report was published at 
the beginning of February 2010. 
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Chapter 4 
4. Measuring Transparency 
Dictionaries define “transparency” as (1) easily seen through or detected; obvious, candid or 
open, clear. Business dictionaries define “transparency” as (2) lack of hidden agendas and 
conditions, accompanied by the availability of full information required for collaboration, 
cooperation, and collective decision making. Other definitions refer to (3) maximum degree of 
disclosure to which agreements, dealings, practices, and transactions are open to all for verification. 
When referring to regulatory matters, “transparency” is defined as (4) essential condition for a free 
and open exchange whereby the rules and reasons behind regulatory measures are fair and clear to 
all participants (Business Dictionary.com). 
(Saxton, 1997) states that a transparent monetary policy “is characterized by lack of secrecy, 
obfuscation, or ambiguity, and should be understandable to those outside the policy process 
including both ordinary citizens as well as legislators responsible for policy oversight.” The same 
author adds that transparency is a multi-dimensional concept and it includes the clarification of 
policy goals, of policy procedures, and the appropriateness in reporting policy decisions. Dillén & 
Nilsson (1998) believe that a policy is transparent when the general public is able to observe and 
deduce the intentions of the central bank, and especially their current intentions. They define it as an 
“ex ante calculating process”, comparing economic agents’ expectations with the announced future 
values for: inflation, interest rates, and nominal exchange rates (Dillén & Nilsson, 1998). The same 
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authors analyze the monetary policy in inflation targeting countries and state that a monetary 
authority increases the policy transparency in the following way: 
 
Table 1: The process of increased monetary policy transparency in inflation targeting countries 
Define the goal for monetary policy in terms of a 
target variable  
A measure of inflation 
Publish a policy document, in which future paths 
of inflation values are presented and analyzed 
Usually Inflation Reports 
Develop and present the analytical tools by 
which inflation prediction are calculated 
 
Create a framework for policy analysis  
 
Clarify what assumptions underlie the 
assessment of inflation prospects and describe 
how the policy conclusions are related to the 
assessment 
Publish a conditional inflation forecast A forecast conditional on unchanged monetary 
policy, i.e. no monetary policy actions, which 
typically implies unchanged nominal short term 
interest rates 
 
Describe in quantitative terms how the target 
variable will be brought back to the target 
Forecast path of actual inflation 
Explain in quantitative terms what kind of 
monetary actions are needed to achieve the 
preferred path of actual inflation  
 
Source: Dillén & Nilsson, 1998 
  
Monetary policy transparency is a broad concept that affects many aspects of monetary 
policymaking (Eijffinger & Geraats, 2005). These authors suggest using a conceptual framework 
that depicts the different phases of the decision-making process. Following their paper, one can 
make a distinction among five aspects of transparency: political, economic, procedural, policy and 
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operational transparency. These aspects match to information disclosure process about the stages of 
monetary policymaking illustrated below. 
Figure 1. A conceptual framework for the monetary policy making process 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Source: Eijffinger & Geraats (2005) 
 
 Political transparency denotes openness about policy objectives. Eijffinger & Geraats (2005) give 
a more detailed explanation of political transparency. It embraces a declaration of the formal 
objectives of monetary policy, including an explicit prioritization so as to avoid interaction of 
potential conflicting goals, and quantitative targets. Political transparency is improved by 
institutional arrangements: central bank independence and central bank contracts, as they guarantee 
that there is no political influence or pressure to diverge from initially stated objectives. Another 
important aspect is that political transparency need not be under control of the central bank, but is 
often determined by political authorities (Government or Parliament). 
 
 Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for sketching the 
monetary policy. This refers the economic data the central bank uses, the policy models it applies to 
build the economic forecasts or assess the effects of its decisions, and the internal forecasts the 
central bank counts on. The internal forecasts are of a particular importance, as the monetary policy 
actions usually take effect with substantial time lags. Eijffinger & Geraats (2005) conclude that the 
central bank’s actions are usually reflecting developments that the monetary authority anticipates. 
 
 Procedural transparency includes openness about the way decisions are taken. It includes a clear 
monetary policy rule or strategy that depicts the monetary policy framework. The way the policy 
decision was attained is communicated through the release of minutes and voting records (Eijffinger 
& Geraats, 2005, Dincer and Eichengreen, 2009). 
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 Policy transparency includes openness about the policy implications. It refers to a prompt 
announcement of policy decisions. In addition, it also encloses an explanation of the decision and a 
policy suggestion or warning of the most likely future policy actions. The policy inclination is 
special interest, because monetary policy actions are usually made in small steps; a central bank may 
tend to change the policy tool, but may in the same time decide to wait until further evidence assures 
moving a full step (Eijffinger & Geraats, 2005, Dincer and Eichengreen, 2009). 
 
 Operational transparency describes openness about the implementation of the central bank’s 
policy actions. It comprises a description of control errors in achieving the target set in the policy 
decision, and describes the unexpected macroeconomic shocks that may affect the transmission of 
monetary policy from the instrument to the outcome. Another kind of operational transparency that 
could be considered for this analysis is the publication of money market interventions that are made 
to implement the policy decisions (Eijffinger & Geraats, 2005). 
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Chapter 5 
5. Methodology 
 
The data is drawn from information on central banks’ websites and in their statutes, annual 
reports, and other published documents. The information is gathered for every year from 2005 
through 2010. The indices of central bank transparency and the methodological approach follow 
closely the work suggested by Dincer & Eichengreen (2009). Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) paper 
has been chosen as a guideline for the current thesis, as these authors have computed the 
transparency index for more than 100 central banks in the world, including the CNB and the NBM, 
for every year from 1998 through 2006. The present thesis takes 2005 as the starting year of the 
analysis, as the results and findings obtained here for the year 2005 and 2006 can be afterwards 
compared with the results of Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) with regard to the CNB and the NBM 
measure of transparency. Another reason for choosing 2005 as the starting point for this analysis, is 
the fact that the last part of this thesis will focus on analyzing how surprising are the monetary 
policy decisions in the two countries based on how much do short-term money market rates change 
after the decision’s announcement. On the NBM website, the time series with the reference 
interbank market interest rates start in 2005, this being a further argument why this work focuses 
specifically on this period. Going back to methodological approach employed by Dincer & 
Eichengreen (2009), it has to be mentioned that these authors have in turn used this method 
suggested initially by Eijffinger and Geraat (2005), also called “independent analysis” approach to 
measure transparency of central banks. This approach of measuring transparency employs using a 
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questionnaire (see Appendix), which is developed on monetary policy issues and the researcher 
independently answers the questions based on information gathered from diverse central bank 
documents: monetary policy reports on the current state of the economy, monetary policy 
statements, speeches of the central bank officials, etc. The questionnaire brings information through 
a set of fifteen questions, with three questions on each aspect on monetary policy transparency: 
political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency. Each question has two or three 
options of response, with a maximum score of 1. In case of two options the central bank is awarded 
either 0 or 1 score but in case of three options there is a middle score of 0.5 (a case of partial 
transparency). In adding up the score, all the questions are given equal weight so on each aspect of 
transparency a central bank can get a maximum score of 3. Each type of transparency is also given 
the same weight so there is no preference for one type of transparency over the others. Thus, a 
central bank can get a maximum score of 15. Using the transparency index developed by Eijffinger 
and Geraat (2005) and then used for a broader number of central banks by Dincer and Eichengreen 
(2009) employs a certain disadvantage and namely the fact that this type of measurement of 
transparency focuses on a variety of communication channels and communication documents – but 
less on the quality of communication and on the content of these documents (Holub, 2008). On the 
other hand, Malik & Din (2008) describe the advantages of using this transparency index. First of 
all, this index is based on an independent analysis (by the researcher) of monetary policy practices, 
unlike survey-based techniques. Malik & Din (2008) state that this independent research is 
important, because in surveys – respondents (central bankers), may have an incentive to depict a 
favorable picture of monetary policy transparency, when the real situation may not be that favorable. 
A second advantage is that the index covers almost all the aspects of monetary policy and thus 
presents a broader measure of transparency as compared with other works that have focused on only 
two or three aspects. The third advantage is that the index is not restricted to any particular type of 
monetary policy framework. Using this type of transparency index, one can measure transparency 
for inflation targeting central banks, as for monetary targeting ones (Malik & Din, 2008).  
In order to analyze how surprising are the monetary policy decisions in Moldova and the 
Czech Republic based on how much do short-term money market rates change after the decision’s 
announcement – the money market rates (the 2 Weeks and 3 Months CHIBOR and PRIBOR) 
collected by each central bank from Reuters and published on their official website, are monitored 
for the period from 2005 – 2010. The decisions of the Council of Administration of the NBM and of 
38 
 
the CNB’s Bank Board are also monitored. In particular, the aim is to observe whether the money 
market rates change after the central banks announce their monetary policy decisions. In order to 
observe if the markets were surprised or no, the date before the central bank’s decision is announced 
and the day after the decision – are monitored. If after the policy decision announcement, the money 
market rates register a significant increase or a decrease – leads to the conclusion that the markets 
were not expecting the decision and that there is a gap of communication between the central bank 
and the public. This translates into lower transparency of the monetary policy of the respective 
central bank. 
In the following section of this thesis, the five aspects of monetary policy transparency for 
the CNB and the NBM will be described, based on the papers of Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) and 
Eijffinge & Geraats (2005). 
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Chapter 6 
6. How Transparent are the National Bank of Moldova and the 
Czech National Bank?  
 
The following part of the thesis will be concerned with constructing a transparency index for 
the CNB and the NBM. The transparency index proposed by Eijffinger & Geraats (2005) and then 
followed by Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) focuses on macroeconomic aspects. In order to assess the 
level of transparency of the Czech National Bank and the National Bank of Moldova, the thesis 
focuses on describing each of the five aspects of transparency: political, economic, procedural, 
policy and operational transparency.  
 
6.1 Political Transparency  
 
The political transparency will firstly be analyzed through the examination of the Monetary 
and Foreign Exchange Policy Reports published on a yearly basis by the NBM and the monetary 
policy Strategic Documents published by the CNB from 2005 through 2010.  
 
National Bank of Moldova 
  
a)  Formal Objectives 
  
Analyzing the National Bank of Moldova monetary documents from 2005 through 2010 – a shift in 
stated objectives can be observed. If in the 2005 Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy report it is 
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stated that the NBM “promotes a monetary and foreign exchange policy aimed at achieving the 
stability of the national currency through due insurance of a relevant degree of national economy 
monetization” (NBM, 2005).  
The same objectives are kept through the year 2006: “the monetary and foreign exchange 
policy promoted by NBM provides the establishment of quantitative targets of money supply in 
economy.” Throughout 2005 and 2006 the NBM was focused on implementing a monetary and 
foreign exchange policy aimed at achieving the objective of “realization and maintenance of the 
stability of the national currency by establishing the monetary, credit and foreign exchange market 
conditions based on market economy principles” (NBM, 2006).  
Starting with 2007, the fundamental objective of the National Bank of Moldova was 
modified from “achieving and maintaining the national currency stability” into “ensuring and 
maintaining the prices stability” (NBM, 2007). In 2008, the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy 
report of NBM states that the monetary and foreign exchange policy of the National Bank of 
Moldova will be targeted at achieving its fundamental objective (i.e. ensuring and maintaining the 
prices stability) – with the purpose of creating a foundation for macroeconomic stability 
achievement (NBM, 2008).  
In 2009 and 2010 the main objective is kept and namely maintenance of price stability, but 
also the monetary reports contain explanations of why this objective is important and how it will be 
achieved. The 2005 and 2006 objective of targeting the exchange rate, in order to maintain the 
stability of the national currency could be even observed in the following years of implementing the 
monetary policy, even though formally – other objectives were stated. The NBM’s target of foreign 
exchange rate can be explained by the fact that most of the economic transactions in Moldova are 
done usually in foreign currency. The exchange rate at the commercial banks change every day and 
there is a high volatility with respect to the values it can take. The majority of population keeps 
saving mostly in euros and US dollars, rather than in Moldovan leis, that is why the NBM has to 
keep track of the evolution of the national currency with respect to foreign currencies.  
Also, from 2005 – through 2009 – usually two objectives were cited, leading to the 
impression that there is no explicit statement of objectives’ prioritization. Even though prioritization 
was mentioned in the monetary policy reports where it is required and thus it could be argued that 
the statement of objectives is done in a transparent way, the uncertainty about the NBM’s actions 
was not entirely removed. Malik & Din (2008) argue that in order to reduce the uncertainty about 
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central bank actions it is important for the central bank to communicate its long-term objectives and 
their prioritization in case of multiple objectives.  
The 2005 – 2007 NBM reports describe National Bank’s intentions and preferences for the 
near future, mostly for one year, however at the end of each monetary policy report there is a note 
that states that the NBM reserves the right to review, over the year, the monetary and foreign 
exchange policy, if certain macroeconomic changes within the economic and financial situation that 
can have an impact on the monetary and foreign exchange policy. The NBM reserves this right also 
in the case of changes within the financing of the Republic of Moldova from international financial 
institutions. These changes depending on the state of the economy increased the uncertainty about 
the NBM’s actions. The monetary reports for the years 2008, 2009 as well as 2010 – do not contain 
this note, which means that the NBM strives to make its statements as clear as possible and wants 
the public to gain trust in its actions. Consequently, the political transparency of NBM is awarded a 
half score on the issue of formal objectives for 2005 – through 2009 and 1 for 2010 (see Table 2 
below). 
Table 2: Political Transparency of National Bank of Moldova and Czech National Bank 
Central Bank National Bank of Moldova Czech National Bank 
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Formal 
Objectives 
0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Quantification 
of Primary 
Objectives 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Institutional 
Arrangements 
0,5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TOTAL 1 1,5 1,5 2,5 2,5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
b)  Quantification of Primary Objectives 
 
Malik & Din (2008) state that announcing the targets for the monetary policy primary 
objectives reduces uncertainty faced by the economic agents in making economic decisions. In 2005 
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and 2006, the NBM states its primary objective as achieving the stability of the national currency 
through providing the establishment of quantitative targets of money supply growth. It states that the 
strategy of the NBM policy uses reserve money as operational objective and broad money as 
intermediary objective. Even though the NBM gives a guideline target on the amount reserve money 
and broad money shall increase, the announcement is not clearly specified. The reader can be easily 
lost around the multitude of numbers and figures the report provides and may not find the ceiling by 
which the reserve money and broad money shall increase throughout that year. The reports also state 
that the Foreign Exchange Policy of the National Bank of Moldova for 2005 and 2006 will be 
achieved through free floating exchange rate regime of the national currency and the establishment 
of the official exchange rate based on prevailing exchange rates in the Forex market.  
In 2007, the formal objective of the NBM changed from “achieving and maintaining the 
national currency stability” into “ensuring and maintaining the prices stability”. Even though the 
limit within inflation rate should be kept is mentioned in the report, the NBM states as well the 
amount by which reserve money and broad money should be kept between throughout the year. 
These targets are, as in the 2005 and 2006 reports, “lost” throughout the report and a reader can 
hardly find the target the NBM is striving to achieve.  
In 2008, the limit to maintain price stability is set into the report; however the targets for the 
reserve money and broad money are already missing. With regard to the foreign exchange policy, 
the NBM maintained a floating exchange rate regime and established the official exchange rate of 
Moldovan Leu (MDL) against the US dollar (USD) based on the exchange rates prevailing in the 
domestic foreign exchange market. The NBM reserved the right to carry out foreign exchange 
interventions with the purpose of mitigating the excess fluctuations of the official exchange rate and 
of making up the international foreign exchange reserves (NBM, 2008).  
In 2009, the target for the fundamental objective of achieving and the maintaining price 
stability has a target stated clearly at the beginning of the report and also the NBM announced the 
possible deviation of the announced level of inflation. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that throughout the years 2005 – 2007, the NBM failed to reduce 
uncertainty about its actions, however starting with 2008, the limit to maintain price stability set into 
the report, the decision from 2010 of publishing medium-term forecasts, together with annual ones, 
will help the NBM to increase awareness about its current and future actions. For the years 2005 – 
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2007, NBM receives 0 points and from 2008 – 2010, 1 point with regard to the quantification of its 
primary objectives.  
 
c) Institutional Arrangements 
In 2006, a new Law on the National Bank of Moldova was adopted on the modification of an 
older Law from 1995. This new law marked the initiation of a new stage in the activity of the NBM. 
Under the new Law, the NBM is an autonomous public legal entity and is responsible to the 
Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. Under the article 3 of this law, the NBM shall have the 
capacity to enter into contracts and issue obligations; acquire and dispose of property, whether 
movable or immovable – for the purpose of its business and institute legal proceedings and be 
subject to such proceedings. Regarding the cooperation with the Governmental Bodies, the NBM 
should cooperate with the Government in pursuing its objectives. Under the Law, the NBM shall 
provide information as requested by economic and financial entities of the Government with respect 
to monetary and financial matters. These entities, in their turn, shall provide information to the 
National Bank as the National Bank may request concerning macroeconomic, monetary and 
financial matters. The Governor of the NBM is nominated by the Parliament at the proposal of the 
Speaker of the Parliament and his mandate is for a period of seven years. He is also the Chair of the 
Council of Administration of the NBM, which is composed of 5 persons. The term of each member 
of the Council of Administration shall be 7 years. The Governor of the NBM or members of the 
Council of Administration should appear before the Parliament to explain the policies of the 
National Bank or to comment on proposed legislation, at the request of the Parliament (Law on 
NBM, 2006).  
In 2006, with the aim of coordinating the monetary, foreign exchange, budget and tax 
policies, the NBM and the Ministry of Finance established the Committee of Liquidity Management, 
the objective of which was designed to ensure an efficient communication and partnership in the 
light of liquidities’ management and monitoring (NBM, 2006). 
In 2008, NBM extended its cooperation with the Ministry of Finance so as to decrease the 
value of the domestic state debt to the NBM. In 2010, the NBM cooperation with the Government of 
the Republic of Moldova and the central public authorities was done mainly in order to promote the 
monetary policy. This cooperation employs permanent exchange of information and dialog 
regarding the fiscal policy, especially tax changes, budgetary wage modifications, pensions and 
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other social benefits and other measures that may affect the price level. In order to establish a 
monetary framework necessary to achieve the primary objective, the NBM works together with the 
National Bureau of Statistics and the National Commission of Financial Market. Moreover, the 
NBM will adopt a methodology and will separate the responsibilities regarding the monthly 
publication of the core inflation with the National Bureau of Statistics.  
In conclusion, since 2006 – more explicit contacts and institutional arrangements between 
the NBM and the Moldovan government have been established. For the institutional arrangements, 
the NBM receives 0,5 points in 2005 (the NBM did not have an explicit instrument independence or 
contract) and 1 point for 2006 – 2010 respectively. 
Czech National Bank  
 
a) Formal Objectives  
 
In December 1997 the CNB announced a switch to inflation targeting regime and this 
represented a historic change in the strategy of Czech monetary policy with regard to the way in 
which policy reacts to economic shocks (Šmídkova & Hrnčíř, 1998). Šmídkova & Hrnčíř (1998) 
state that the Czech Republic was the first economy in transition to adopt inflation targeting as the 
explicit framework for its monetary policy, while most countries had switched to inflation targeting 
only after inflation was under control and on a decreasing path. 
The primary objective of the CNB is set according to the Act on the CNB to maintain price 
stability. The CNB supports as well the general economic policies of the Government leading to 
sustainable economic growth, without prejudice to its primary objective. The objective of 
maintaining price stability reflects the central bank's responsibility for sustainable economic growth 
and entails fostering a stable environment for the development of entrepreneurial activity (Act on 
CNB). Price stability is defined by the inflation target. The CNB strives to hit the target by changing 
its monetary policy interest rates and using other monetary policy instruments and measures 
specified by the Bank Board (CNB Annual Report, 2005).  
Another CNB key objective is to maintain financial stability. As of April 2006, the Act on 
CNB requires the bank to analyze the evolution of the financial system, see to the sound operation 
and development of the financial market in the Czech Republic and contribute to the stability of its 
financial system as a whole (Article 2).  
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The clear specification of formal objectives, their prioritization and the explanation of how 
these objectives would be achieved entitles the CNB to receive 1 point for all the years from 2005 – 
2010.  
b) Quantification of Primary Objectives 
In 2004, the CNB has set its inflation target for the period starting with January 2006. In the 
period from 2006 – 2009, the CNB’s target was set in the form of annual growth in the consumer 
price index (CPI) of 3% with a tolerance interval of +/- 1 percentage point. The CNB has created a 
framework for monetary policy decision-making sufficiently in advance, so as to anchor long-term 
inflation expectations. The CNB has set this target as a medium-term one from which actual 
inflation could deviate temporarily. The CNB explains that this inflation target has been set slightly 
above the price stability level declared by the European Central Bank for the euro, which is “close to 
2%”. This small inflation differential reflects the long-term real convergence of the Czech economy 
towards the euro area average, which will continue for some time after the Czech Republic’s 
accession to the euro area (CNB, 2004). 
In March 2007, a new inflation target of 2% was announced with effect from January 2010 
(CNB, 2007). The CNB lowered the target to 2% with an unchanged tolerance band. The decrease in 
target was published well in advance in order to reduce costs (CNB Annual Report, 2009).  
An important detail is that the target for future inflation is presented in every Inflation Report 
from 2005 – till 2010. Taking all of these details into consideration, CNB receives the full score for 
the quantification of primary objectives.  
c) Institutional Arrangements 
The CNB has a high degree of independence from political structures when performing its 
functions and tasks, since it begun its activity in January 1993. The CNB webpage, at the Central 
Bank Independence Section lists that the CNB enjoys personal independence – there are no 
political pressures during the appointment and dismissal of members of the CNB Bank Board, which 
consists of seven members. The CNB Bank Board is appointed and dismissed from office by the 
President of the Czech Republic without the assistance of the government. An important aspect is 
also the fact that the CNB Act defines the reasons justifying the dismissal of a Bank Board member. 
CNB is awarded also institutional independence, i.e. when carrying out and implementing the 
monetary policy and the tasks conferred to it by law, the CNB Bank Board “may not seek or take 
instructions from the President, Parliament, administrative authorities or from any other body.”  
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The operational independence refers to the fact that the CNB has autonomy when setting 
inflation targets and selecting the instruments required in achieving them. When setting the 
exchange rate regime, the CNB has to conduct discussions with the Government, but in such a 
manner so as not to affect its primary monetary objective. The CNB and the Government inform 
each other on issues regarding the principles and actions of implementing the monetary 
policy. Another type of independence the CNB is enjoying is the financial independence, which 
means that the CNB is prevented from any direct financing of the public sector or of the bodies it 
controls. The budget of the CNB is approved by the Bank Board. This budget is consisted in such a 
way, so as to make clear what are the CNB´s property acquisition expenses and operational 
expenses. At the end of the financial year, the CNB has to compile a profit and loss account and an 
external auditor has to verify it. This is then used as the basis for an annual financial report, which is 
submitted to Parliament for review. The CNB is also required to disclose regular ten-day balance 
sheets on its financial position.
3
 
In conclusion, the CNB is awarded 1 for all sub-indices and all years, as the CNB has a clear 
specification and a formal statement of its monetary policy objectives. It also has a quantification of 
the primary objective and there are explicit institutional arrangements between the CNB and the 
government. 
6.2 Economic Transparency  
The economic transparency will firstly be analyzed through the examination of the Annual 
Reports, the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy Reports and the Inflation Reports published on 
a yearly basis by the NBM and the Inflation Reports and the monetary policy Strategic Documents 
published by the CNB from 2005 through 2010.  
National Bank of Moldova  
a) Economic Data 
The NBM Monetary Aggregates documents published since 2005 – 2010 contain time series 
with the information about the money supply in the economy. In 2005 – the data is aggregated and 
presented on a yearly basis, however starting with 2006 – the data is presented on a monthly basis. 
The 2005 – 2009 Annual Reports contain statistical data regarding the money supply evolution of 
                                                          
3
 CNB website Central Bank Independence.  http://www.cnb.cz/en/faq/faq_mp/cb_indenpendence.html 
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Moldova, as well as comments about this evolution. In 2005, the NBM presents the annual growth 
of price level, but starting with 2006 – 2009, the Annual Reports contain data on inflation on a 
quarterly basis. Throughout the same period of time, the NBM publishes as well information about 
the real GDP growth – however the data is aggregated and presented for the entire year, rather than 
for each quarter separately. For the year 2010 – quarterly time series for GDP, unemployment rate, 
inflation and money supply are published on the NBM website. Quarterly Monetary Reports started 
to be published from February 2010, where medium term targets are set and explanations of 
reduction or increase in the previous forecasted values are provided. In conclusion, the NBM 
receives 0 points for 2005 (none of the five variables important for the conduct of monetary policy 
are available on a quarterly basis: money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity 
utilization.) Even though in the period 2006 – 2009, money supply and inflation are presented on a 
quarterly basis – the NBM still receives 0 points, because only 2 variables are present, the others 
either are missing, or are again presented on a yearly basis. For 2010 – the NBM receives 0,5, 
because 4 of these important variables: GDP, unemployment rate, inflation and money supply – are 
published on a quarterly basis.  
 
Table 3: Economic Transparency of National Bank of Moldova and Czech National Bank 
Central Bank National Bank of Moldova Czech National Bank 
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Economic Data 0 0 0 0 0 0,5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Macroeconomic 
Model 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Macroeconomic 
Forecast 
 
0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TOTAL 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
b) Macroeconomic Models 
The NBM does not disclose the macroeconomic model it uses for policy analysis. It also 
does not provide publicly in its website the forecasting equations for the key variables or models. 
This is the reason why Moldova receives 0 for all the years since 2005 through 2010.  
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c) Macroeconomic Forecast 
In the NBM Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy for 2005, 2006, the NBM publishes 
numerical forecast on inflation and GDP one year ahead. In the 2007, 2008 and 2009 NBM 
Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy documents, the NBM stipulates the GDP growth in real 
terms.  
In 2010, in order to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process, the NBM started 
to publish quarterly the Monetary Policy Report, which contains the analysis of the macroeconomic 
situation and a forecast of the medium – term inflation, annual rate of real GDP forecast, regulated 
prices and the volume of remittances. The NBM includes as well economic forecasts for its partner 
economies: the euro zone, the Russian Federation and Romania.  
For the macroeconomic forecast, the NBM receives 0.5 for 2005 – 2010, as it publishes 
quarterly forecasts for three out of the five variables: inflation, money supply and GDP.  
Czech National Bank 
 
a) Economic Data 
 
The CNB publishes statistics related to monetary and financial data, balance of payments, 
financial accounts, and government finance statistics. The CNB website announces that the 
individual statistics are compiled in accordance with international standards and standards of the 
European Union. The section “Statistics” from the CNB website, contains not only the data and their 
methodology, but also commented publications and the relevant regulations at both national and 
European and international level
4
. Moreover, the CNB disposes of a number of systems for data 
collection, processing and dissemination; the most important with respect to publication is ARAD, a 
unique system of time series of statistical data compiled by the CNB and supplemented with 
selected data from external sources (CNB website). On ARAD, there are monthly statistics 
regarding the money supply, inflation and unemployment, and quarterly data on the GDP 
(seasonally adjusted). Moreover, regarding the inflation statistical data, the CNB has on its website a 
subsection “Inflation”, where it provides information on inflation measured and released by the 
Czech Statistical Office, the inflation target, the inflation forecast published by the CNB and 
                                                          
4
 CNB website Statistics http://www.cnb.cz/en/statistics/ 
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inflation expectations surveyed by the CNB. In addition, starting with 2008 quarterly Inflation 
Reports, the CNB publishes on its website the background data to all figures and tables contained in 
the Inflation Reports. As an example, along with the fourth Inflation Report from 2008, the CNB 
published on its website a subsection “Tables and charts in the text”, where is provides Excel files 
with statistical data for monetary conditions, demand and output, the labor market, the balance of 
payments, monetary developments, import prices and produces prices and inflation. As regards 
capacity utilization
5
, in the Czech Republic, it is available for the industry only and is presented in 
the Inflation Reports. However, the CNB publishes estimates of the output gap, which fits into the 
definition of the capacity utilization. 
In conclusion, due to the fact that the CNB publishes all the available statistical information 
plus the estimates of the output gap, information which is relevant for the conduct of monetary 
policy, receives 1 point.  
 
b) Macroeconomic Model 
 
The CNB discloses the macroeconomic models it uses for policy analysis. In a work 
published by the CNB in 2003 “The Czech National Bank’s Forecasting and Policy Analysis 
System”, two authors: Stanislav Polak and David Vavra write about the “Models Used in the 
Forecasting and Policy Analysis System.” Polak and Vavra write that the Forecasting and Policy 
Analysis System (FPAS) in the CNB uses several models. There is the core quarterly projection 
model (QPM), which primarily serves as a disciplining device around which the forecast is 
constructed. It embodies the institution’s understanding of the forward looking transmission 
mechanisms based on a systematic reaction of policy interest rates to major disturbances. The 
models that complement the core QPM are the models that support the inflation forecast. Polak and 
Vavra state as well that when preparing a forecast, the CNB wants to paint a broad picture that starts 
with the question “Where is the economy now?” and moves to “What forces will drive it over the 
short and medium term?” This process helps the Board answer the most important question: What 
does monetary policy need to do to accomplish its inflation and stabilization objectives? In order to 
                                                          
5
According to Business Dictionary.com, capacity utilization is the extent to which the productive capacity of a plant, 
firm, or country is being used in generation of goods and services and it refers to the relationship between 
actual output that “is” produced with the installed equipment and the potential output which “could” be produced with it, 
if capacity was fully used. 
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explain the models, the authors have arranged them in the form of a timeline, running from the short 
term to the medium term. 
 
Figure 2. The Role of Models in the Forecast Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
    Short run analysis                   Medium-term analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CNB, 2003 
 
In the same work “The Czech National Bank’s Forecasting and Policy Analysis System” 
published in 2003, Polak and Vavra describe other models used by the CNB: Hermin CR, Fiscal 
Policy Stance Model, Trade Balance Models, Model of Optimizing IS Curve and Monetary Policy 
Effects, Small Linear Error-Correction Model with Model-Consistent Expectations, etc.  
Another important feature of the CNB presenting its forecast – is the fact that the central 
bank has a special section on the website, where it explains how is the forecast created, what 
economic variables it takes into account and who participates in the forecast.  
In the Factsheet published in June 2010, the CNB explains as well that its estimates showed 
how interest rate changes have their greatest impact on inflation about 12 to 18 months after the 
decision was taken. The CNB focuses on this time horizon in its monetary policy discussions; 
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however it also takes into account the developments before and after this period. The forecasts for 
inflation and the economy as a whole are based on past and present developments and on 
assumptions regarding several key economic variables. The results generated by the models are then 
discussed by the CNB’s experts. The models are based on the CNB’s knowledge of how strongly 
developments in the external environment (such as changes in inflation or economic growth in other 
countries and world prices of raw materials), price-related administrative decisions made by Czech 
state and local authorities, and, in particular, changes to the CNB’s interest rates, pass over into 
various areas of the economy and eventually into inflation. The CNB also states that the two most 
important channels through which changes to the CNB’s rates affect the economy run by client 
interest rates and by the exchange rate. Client interest rates move in step with changes in the CNB’s 
rates and affect demand. The exchange rate also usually reacts to changes in the CNB’s rates, 
especially if such changes are large and are perceived by the markets as long-term. The exchange 
rate strongly affects prices of imported goods and as result inflation. The exchange rate also affects 
exports and imports and aggregate demand. The CNB writes as well that the key model it uses for 
the monetary policy decisions takes as well into account the behavior of the central bank itself 
which is consistent with its constitutional objectives (CNB, 2010d).  
Taking into account that the CNB discloses the macroeconomic models it uses for policy 
analysis, it receives 1 for 2005 – 2010 periods. 
 
c) Macroeconomic Forecast 
 
The CNB has a good practice in sharing its forecast with the public. If in the NBM’s case, 
the forecast is somehow “hidden” in the quarterly or annual reports, the CNB publishes its forecast 
directly on the web site, with a link titled: “CNB forecast”. Thus, there is a better access to the CNB 
forecast than to the NBM one. The CNB regularly publishes its forecast directly on the website 
starting with the third quarter of 2006. The forecasts made in 2005 can be found in the Inflation 
reports published by the CNB.  
The CNB’s macroeconomic forecast is very important, as it represents the key source 
material for the CNB Bank Board’s decisions. The macroeconomic forecast is drawn up by the 
Monetary and Statistics Department in interaction with the board members. It represents the CNB 
experts’ views of the most likely future evolution of the economy, including the behavior of the 
central bank itself. The forecast is based on a consistent medium-term framework taking the form of 
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a model approach which is supplemented with an expert opinion primarily affecting the short-term 
forecast horizon. The most relevant for monetary policy decision-making is the inflation forecast at 
the so-called monetary policy horizon (about 12–18 months ahead), which affects the interest rate 
settings (CNB, 2010d).  
As stated before, starting with the third quarter of 2006, along with the forecast published in 
the quarterly Inflation Reports, the CNB started to share its forecast directly on the web site. 
Another important feature of the CNB forecast is the fact that along with presenting it in the 
Inflation Reports and on its website, the CNB organizes meetings with analysts – to present and 
explain CNB’s economic projections. The actual forecast is thus presented together with the 
presentations from these meetings.  
Starting with 2008, the CNB started to publish the interest rate path in numerical form as a 
fan chart. Fan charts started also to be used for other variables’ forecasts. 
In 2009, the CNB started to publish the forecast-consistent path of the nominal koruna-euro 
exchange rate in fan chart form. It took a significant step to increase its monetary policy 
transparency and thus, this made the CNB the only central bank in the world to publish a forecast for 
a nominal exchange rate in comparison with a specific currency. The CNB states that the disclosure 
of the exchange rate forecast in numerical form means that full transparency of the CNB forecast 
has been achieved, as this enhances the transparency of the Bank Board’s monetary policy 
considerations, giving external observers a better understanding of CNB monetary policy (CNB, 
2009a).  
In 2010 – the CNB, along with publishing and explaining the forecast in the quarterly 
inflation report, it also presents changes and risks to it. Also, the presentation of the forecast in the 
Quarterly Reports is improved: every macroeconomic factor being projected is presented from a 
new paragraph and is written in bold, which makes it much easier to read.   
In conclusion, taking into account that CNB publishes quarterly numerical forecasts for 
inflation and output for the medium term (usually two years ahead), the CNB receives 1 for the 
Macroeconomic forecast indicator starting with 2005 until 2010.  
6.3 Procedural Transparency 
 
The procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. The 
procedural transparency will be analyzed through the examination of the Annual Reports, the 
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Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy Reports, the Inflation Reports published on a yearly basis 
by the NBM. Press Releases published after the meetings of the NBM Council of Administration 
will also be analyzed. For the CNB, the monetary policy Strategic Documents and the Minutes of 
the Board Meetings published by the bank from 2005 through 2010 will be analyzed. 
National Bank of Moldova   
 
a) Explicit Policy Rule or Strategy 
 
The NBM Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy Strategy for 2005 states that since the 
introduction of the national currency in 1993 NBM has promoted a monetary and foreign exchange 
policy aimed at achieving the stability of the national currency through insurance of a relevant 
degree of national economy monetization. The policy promoted by NBM is monetary targeting, 
providing the establishment of quantitative targets of money supply growth. The strategy of the 
NBM policy embodies the use of reserve money as operational objective and of broad money as 
intermediary objective. No clear rule has been found stating how the instrument is moved if the 
money growth deviates from the target.   
In the year 2008, for the optimization of monetary policy operations, the National Bank 
created an adequate database for the analysis, modeling and forecasting framework. The data base 
will have the role to clarify the elaboration process of the monetary policy and to increase the public 
awareness about the NBM policies. It will also increase the credibility level of the civil society 
towards the monetary policy promoted by the NBM.  
In 2009, the NBM continued pursuing the achievement of the inflation targeting strategy.  
In the 2010 Monetary Policy Strategy, the NBM’s primary objective is to achieve and 
maintain price stability so as to contribute to developing of a relatively stable macroeconomic 
framework that will enhance economic development and ensure a sustained growth. Setting the 
interval for inflation, the NBM notes that when some unforeseen shocks move or are expected to 
move inflation outside that declared interval, the monetary policy will have as a goal to bring 
inflation as close as possible to the objective during a medium-term horizon. During the same time 
horizon, monetary policy instruments were implemented to achieve the inflation objective without 
causing excessive adverse impact on the economic activity.  
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In conclusion, due to the fact that since 2005 – 2009, the NBM does not clearly provide an 
explicit policy rule or strategy, receives 0 points. In 2010 however, due to improvements in 
portraying the strategy, NBM receives 1.  
 
b) Comprehensive account of policy deliberations 
The National Bank of Moldova has its Council of Administration (CA) composed of 5 
members, which meets and discusses monetary policy decisions. The NBM announces its policy 
decisions in press releases published on the central bank’s website. In all of its press releases since 
2005 till 2010 – the NBM however does not provide a comprehensive account of policy 
deliberations. This is the reason why the NBM receives 0 for policy deliberations.  
c) Disclosure of reaching monetary decisions 
Analyzing the monetary documents published on the NBM website since 2005 through 2010, 
there is no information publicly shared regarding the way each decision was reached on the level of 
the NBM’s operating instrument or target. There are no voting records from the NBM’s Council of 
Administration’s meetings and this leads to the conclusion that the NBM receives 0 for all the years 
included in the independent analysis, i.e. 2005 – 2010. 
 
Table 4: Procedural Transparency of National Bank of Moldova and Czech National Bank 
Central Bank National Bank of Moldova Czech National Bank 
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Explicit Policy 
Rule 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Account of 
policy 
deliberations 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Disclosure of 
reaching 
monetary 
decisions 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 
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Czech National Bank 
 
a) Explicit Policy Rule or Strategy  
The CNB writes on its web site that its reaction function is represented in the g3 model by 
the relationship between the nominal interest rate and expected inflation. The equation is based on a 
modified Taylor rule. Formally, the CNB’s reaction function is expressed as: 
 
it = ρit-1 + (1- ρ)(τt + ψπt+4) + εt 
 
where it is the monetary policy nominal interest rate, ρ is the interest rate smoothing parameter, τt is 
the equilibrium monetary policy nominal interest rate, which is the sum of the equilibrium real 
interest rate and model-consistent inflation expectations, ψ is the weight of the deviation of inflation 
from the target, πt+4 is the expected deviation of inflation from the inflation target, and εt is the 
monetary policy shock. The parameters of the rule were calibrated to ensure that monetary policy 
has a stabilizing effect. Given the forward-looking nature of the reaction function, this functional 
form cannot be estimated by means of single-equation econometric methods based on historical 
data. The reaction function determines the interest rates with regard to the deviation of expected 
monetary-policy relevant inflation from the inflation target at the monetary policy horizon, which is 
set to four quarters in the g3 model. The estimate for inflation at the monetary policy horizon 
reflects all macroeconomic variables entering the model
6
. 
The CNB also states that the achieving of inflation targets is the main factor determining 
decision-making about changes in monetary policy instruments at any specific stage. It also states 
that while setting the policy instruments, it will take into account the shocks and extraordinary 
events whose causes are outside the reach of monetary policy measures
7
.  
 Taking into account that the CNB provides an explicit policy strategy that describes its 
monetary policy framework, it receives 1 for 2005 – 2010. 
  
                                                          
6
 CNB website Monetary Policy in the g3 model 
http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/inflation_reports/2009/2009_II/boxes_and_annexes/ir_II_2009_box_III.html  
7
 CNB website CNB Monetary Strategy Document 
http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/strategic_documents/c_dms.html 
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b) Comprehensive account of policy deliberations 
 
The CNB publishes the minutes of the Bank Board meeting, reflecting the Bank Board 
members’ discussion. The minutes are usually published 8 days later after the meeting. However, 
until April 2005, they were published 12 days after the monetary policy meeting. The CNB 
publishes minutes from all monetary policy meetings. Starting with October, 2006 – the CNB 
accompanies the minutes with a presentation from the CNB press conference regarding the decisions 
taken by the Bank Board members. Starting with 2008 – there was a reduction in the number of 
Bank Board meetings to 8 from 12. Also starting with 2008, the CNB started to publish votes cast 
by name (CNB). In 2010, a change has occurred in the way Minutes are published by the CNB. 
Until the third quarter of 2010 – the CNB was publishing the Minutes from the Bank’s Board 
meetings in the quarterly inflation reports, while in the third Inflation Report from 2010 – it decided 
that the minutes of the Bank’s Board meetings will no longer be included in the Inflation Reports 
and will only be available on the CNB web site.  
 Due to the fact that CNB publishes comprehensive minutes 8 days after its Bank Board 
meetings – it receives 1 for the comprehensive account of policy deliberations indicator for 2005 – 
2010.  
c) Disclosure of reaching monetary decisions 
When publishing the Minutes from the Bank Board meetings in 2005, 2006, 2007 – there are 
non-attributed voting records. Usually, the information about voting is given in the last paragraph of 
the Minutes from the meeting and it is usually formulated in the following way: “At the close of the 
meeting, the Board decided to leave the CNB two-week repo rate unchanged at 2.50%. All seven 
board members present voted in favor of this decision” (CNB, 2005) or when there is no unanimity 
of decisions: “After discussing the situation report, the Board decided by a majority vote to leave the 
CNB two-week repo rate unchanged at 3.25%. Five members voted in favor of this decision, and 
two members voted for increasing rates by 0.25 percentage point” (CNB, 2007c). Starting with 
February, 2008 – the CNB started to publish individual voting records regarding the decisions taken 
during the Bank Board meetings. The individual voting records are provided in every publication of 
the Meetings from 2008 – throughout 2010. 
Thus, analyzing the CNB documents regarding the way central bank discloses how each 
decision on the level of its main operating instrument or target was reached, CNB receives 0.5 for 
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2005 – 2007, as non-attributed voting records are shared with the public. For 2008 – 2010 – CNB is 
awarded 1 for the disclosure of reaching monetary decisions, as it publishes individual voting 
records and gives the names of the person taking the decision, along with the information whether it 
voted against or in favor of the decision. 
6.4 Policy Transparency 
 
The following part of the thesis will focus on analyzing the policy transparency, which is 
concerned with monitoring whether the central bank disclosures its policy decision is a prompt way, 
together with an explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of future 
policy actions. 
National Bank of Moldova  
a) Announcing policy decisions  
 
The decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target are announced 
promptly on the NBM’s website through a press release. The NBM’s Council of Administration 
meets each month and after the decision is taken, a press release is published.  
In 2005, there are 6 published press releases on the NBM website and they announce they 
decisions taken by the NBM’s Council of Administration. An important thing to be mentioned is the 
fact that the press release is published right after the meeting of the CA and it announces that the 
decision taken will enter into force after being published in the Official Monitor of the Republic of 
Moldova. As an example, the CA’s decision to increase the base rate by 1.5 p.p. on February 10, 
2005, entered into force on February, 18, 2005 – on the day this decision was published in the 
Official Monitor. It is not clear whether there were no changes in policy or the NBM wanted to keep 
the decision secret, but the CA did not publicly share its decisions in the months of January, May, 
April, July, October and November, 2005. 
In 2006, there are 4 press releases (no press release for January, February, April, May, June, 
July, August and October, 2006), in 2007 – the NBM announced its monetary policy decisions in 3 
press releases (no press releases published for January, February, March, April, May, June, July, 
October and December 2007), in 2008 – the NBM published 5 press releases (no press release for 
February, March, April, June, July and October, 2008), in 2009 – there are 7 published press 
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releases announcing the CA’s decisions (for the months of January, April, May and October – there 
are no published press releases) and in 2010 – 12, which means that 2010 is the only year when the 
NBM announced the decisions of its Council of Administration in each month. 
Taking this information into account and due to the fact that the NBM announces its policy 
decisions, but not regularly, after each meeting of the Council of Administration – the NBM 
receives 0 points for the period of  2005 – 2009. In 2010, however, NBM is awarded 1 point, 
because it shared all its monetary policy decisions promptly, without any time lags.  
 
Table 5: Policy Transparency of National Bank of Moldova and Czech National Bank 
Central Bank National Bank of Moldova Czech National Bank 
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Announcement 
of Policy 
Decisions 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Explanation of 
the policy 
decision 
 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 1 
Policy 
inclination 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0,5 0,5 0,5 1 1 1 
TOTAL 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2,5 2,5 3 
 
b) Explanation of the policy decision 
Regarding the question whether the central bank provides an explanation when it announces 
policy decisions, the National Bank of Moldova has its Council of Administration (CA) composed 
of 5 members, which meets and discusses monetary policy decisions. In 2005, after the meeting of 
the Council of Administration from February 10, the CA decided to reduce the basic rate of the 
National Bank applied on commercial banks’ refinancing by 1,5 p.p. The press release which 
announces this decision states only that the CA took this decision, because it had to be taken into 
account the inflation dynamics and the present conditions of money market. The press release does 
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not offer any other reason which stood behind that decision (NBM, February 2005). In the same 
year, at the next meeting of the CA, on March 24 – the NBM only announces that taking into 
account the inflation dynamics and the monetary and macroeconomic indicators, the CA of the 
NBM has decided to maintain the interest rates of the NBM at the level set on February 10, 2005. A 
new press release was published in June, announcing that the rates on the NBM monetary regulation 
instruments will be maintained at the level set in February, 2005, however there is no explanation 
offered for the taken decision. In August, 2005 – NBM’s CA announces that the basic rate of the 
NBM applied on commercial banks will be reduced by 0.5 p.p. and will have the value of 12.5% per 
year. In September and December, 2005 – the NBM announces that the rates on the NBM monetary 
regulation instruments will be maintained at the level set in August, 2005.  
In 2006 – the first press release was the one published in March and it announces that the 
rates on the NBM monetary regulation instruments will be maintained at the level set in August, 
2005. The only explanation accompanying this decision is the one present at the beginning of each 
press release since 2005: “taking into account the inflation dynamics and the monetary and 
macroeconomic indicators…” The press release from June 2006 announces that the rate applied on 
commercial banks’ refinancing will be maintained at the level from August 2005 and namely 12.5% 
per year. In the press releases from 2006, the NBM does not provide a clear explanation when it 
announces its policy decision.    
An important feature of the press releases published in 2007 is the fact that they contain 
more explanations and justifications for the CA’s decisions. For example the press release published 
in September, 2007 announces an increase in the base rate by 2.5 p.p. at the level of 16.0%. This 
decision is accompanied also by 4 paragraphs of comments and reasons of the undertaken decisions. 
The NBM explains that the increase was due to the NBM concern related to maintaining of the 
inflation indicator within the limit of 10% by the end of 2007. The press release also states that the 
NBM is ready to use all its available instruments with a view of maintaining and ensuring the prices 
stability. The NBM states as well in its press release that the drought consequences compromised 
the efforts to reduce inflation starting with the first semester and caused an essential increase of 
prices on foodstuff products, contributing to the considerable growth of inflationary expectations. 
Another explanation contained in the press release is that there were essential foreign currency 
inflows recorded over 2007 and this determined the NBM to intensify foreign currency acquisitions 
that led to the increase of several monetary indicators over the planned level. Another trend by 
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which the Moldovan economy can be characterized was the extension of credits to economy, 
especially of those in free convertible currency. The NBM also explains that the growth of interest 
rates of the NBM was done together with another prudential measure of the monetary policy 
undertaken by NBM – gradual increase by 5.0 p.p. of the required reserves ratio from the means 
attracted by banks in free convertible currency. The NBM concludes that the undertaken actions 
have the purpose of counteracting the inflationary pressures and of reducing the inflation rate within 
the scheduled limits. In the last press release from 2007 – the one from November 1 – the CA 
announced its decision to maintain the interest rates at the level established on September 26, 2007. 
The press release also contains information regarding the measures the NBM undertook in order to 
contribute to the stabilization of the macroeconomic situation and to prevent the increase of 
inflationary pressures. Namely the fact that the inflationary expectations persist – determined the 
NBM to intervene through monetary instruments with a view of avoiding another acceleration of the 
growth of CPI. 
In all 5 press communiqués from 2008, the NBM announces its monetary policy decision 
accompanied by explanations and projections of the NBM.  
In 2009 press releases the NBM continues to make public the decisions undertaken by its 
Council of Administration.  
An interesting feature about the press releases from 2010 worth to be mentioned is that one 
can observe the trend and the evolution of the press releases since 2005 until 2010. If in 2005 – the 
press releases were shorter, some of them not longer than 2 paragraphs, the ones from 2010 – are 
around 2 – 3 pages long and along with the announced decisions of the CA, contain the reasoning 
behind the undertaken decisions. In the first press release from 2010 for example, the NBM states 
that the decisions of the NBM’s CA have a preventive character and aim at reversing the inflation 
trend, which means leading it back to the medium-term declared limits. The press release also 
stresses out that the CA recognizes the necessity of finding the equilibrium between the achievement 
and maintenance of price stability and the maintenance of necessary conditions for the economic 
growth. A new feature that is present in the 2010 press releases and was missing from the previous 
ones is the announcement that a more detailed analysis of the medium term inflation forecast will be 
presented in the Monetary Policy Report and the date of its publication is announced, as well as the 
information regarding the next meeting of the CA of the NBM concerning the monetary policy.  
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In conclusion, due to the fact that the press releases from 2005 and 2006 – contain only the 
announcement of the monetary policy decision and lack a clear explanation behind that decision – 
NBM receives 0 points, as an explanation like “taking into account the inflation dynamics, the 
present conditions of money market”, or “taking into account the inflation dynamics, the monetary 
and macroeconomic indicators” are not sufficient and credible to explain the reason behind an 
increase or a decrease in the base rate. Due to the fact that starting with 2007 – 2010, the press 
releases contain more information regarding the reasons behind the undertaken decisions – the NBM 
receives 1. 
c) Policy inclination or future policy actions 
Analyzing the press releases from 2005 and 2006 – the NBM does not disclose any explicit 
policy inclination nor does not provide an explicit indication of likely future policy actions.  
In the second press releases from 2007, the NBM states, along with the announcement of its 
decision that it is ready to use all its available instruments with a view of maintaining and ensuring 
the prices stability. In the last press release from 2007, the NBM notes that due to the persistency of 
inflationary expectations determines the NBM to intervene through monetary instruments with a 
view of avoiding another speed-up of the growth of consumer prices index. 
 In the first press release from 2008, the NBM states that the outlook for price stability is 
subject to some risks, so the NBM finds it necessary to keep the interest rates for the monetary 
policy instruments at the announced level until the trends of inflation moderation are set out in the 
course of 2008. At the same time, in the context of strengthening the process of inflation mitigation, 
the NBM mentions that it will continue to monitor the evolution of the macroeconomic and 
monetary indicators, of the money market conditions and will, upon necessity, undertake firm and 
prompt measures aimed at ensuring macroeconomic stability. It is important to mention that the 
NBM explicitly state what will be the measures aimed at ensuring the macroeconomic stability – it 
just states that at a general level. The same general statements about the use of all available 
instruments in order to ensure the maintenance of the inflation rate within certain limits are part of 
each press release throughout 2008. The press releases published on March 12, and on May 23, 2008 
do not contain an explicit indication of likely future policy actions, however they state that the size 
of the base rate and that of required reserves ratio will be re-examined under the conditions of a new 
clear disinflation trend formation. In the press release from November 27, 2008 – the NBM states 
that it considers as possible in the future the adoption of some decisions aimed to the further 
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liberalization of the promoted monetary policy, with the purpose to support the real sector through 
the enlargement of the banks’ lending possibilities.  
 In the press releases from 2009, the NBM continues to state in general terms that will 
carefully monitor the situation on the domestic and external, credit, foreign currency and money 
market, will undertake adequate and necessary measures in order to minimize the effects of the 
world economy on the economy of the Republic of Moldova. Some of the press releases from 2009 
(as an example the one from July, 2009) contain however information about the possible concrete 
actions (like the possibility to decrease the level of the base rate or the level of obligatory reserves) 
the NBM might undertake throughout the remaining year. In the press release from August, 2009 – 
the NBM also notes that the CA’s decision of reducing the base rate by 1.0 p.p. will have as a 
consequence an increase in the commercial banks’ liquidity with about 480 million lei, $11.4 
million and 12.6 million euro. Thus, the level of excessive liquidity in the banking sector will 
increase till around 2 billion lei, which along with a reduction in the base rate, 
will further reduce the diminution of market interest rates and it will lead to the process of 
widening the credit offers to the real sector of the economy. 
 In conclusion, due to the fact that the NBM does not explicitly disclose the policy inclination 
after every policy meeting, receives 0 for the years 2005 through 2010. 
Czech National Bank 
 
a) Announcing policy decisions  
 
The CNB announces its decisions from the Bank Board’s meetings immediately after the 
monetary policy meeting. In 2005 – 2009, the CNB used to publish press releases announcing the 
change in rates decided by the members of the CNB’s Board immediately after the end of each 
monetary policy meeting. Later on, it has started to publish the Bank’s Board interest rate decision, 
as a rule after the end of monetary policy meeting, at 1 p.m. Then a press conference follows at 2.30 
p.m. During the press conference, the CNB releases a brief digest of the information which the Bank 
Board based its discussion on, a list of the risks pertaining to the current forecast according to the 
Bank Board members, and the Bank Board’s decisions regarding the interest rate settings, including 
the ratio of the votes cast. The presentation given at the press conference is made available 
immediately after the press conference, usually at around 3 p.m. Since May 2007, audio recordings 
(in Czech only) from the press conferences have been made available and since December 2009, 
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also videos (also only in Czech) from the press conferences have been made available on the CNB 
website about one hour after the press conference
8
.  
Taking into account that the CNB announces the decisions of the Bank Board’s meetings 
promptly, on the day of implementation – receives 1 for this factor. 
 
b) Explanation of the policy decision 
On the CNB website, when analyzing the Bank’s Board meetings from 2005 and 2006 (until 
October) – there are no presentations from the press conferences right after the monetary policy 
meetings offered in English. For the years 2005 and 2006 (until October) the changes regarding the 
policy decisions are announced through press release, without any explanation of the decision taken. 
For example, a press release published on January, 27 2005 – the CNB announces that the “Bank 
Board decided to lower the limit 2W repo rate to 2.25%, the discount rate to 1.25% and the Lombard 
rate to 3.25%. The new interest rates will take effect as from tomorrow, 28 January 2005” (CNB, 
2005d). 
Starting with October, 2006 – the CNB accompanies the Minutes of the Bank’s Board by 
presentations, provided both in Czech and in English, from the press conference, where is presents 
the monetary policy decision taken and the ratio of the votes cast. Until November, 2009 – the 
presentation at the press conference did not include an explicit slide called “Reasons for the 
decision”, however the whole press conference was about explaining the decision – by presenting 
the forecast, assessment of its risks, etc. Starting with November, 2009 – the presentations at the 
press conferences contain an explicit sections where the CNB explains the reasons behind the 
decision. The explanation of the decision usually includes forward-looking assessments. For 
example, one of the presentations announcing the monetary policy decision shared with the public 
on May 6, 2010 – states that six out of seven Bank Board members “decided by a majority vote to 
lower the two-week repo rate by 0.25 p.p. to 0.75%. At the same time, it decided to cut the Lombard 
rate by the same amount, to 1.75%. The discount rate remains unchanged at 0.25%” (CNB, 2010a). 
This decision is followed by an explanation, which states that the decision was taken, while keeping 
in mind that headline and monetary – policy relevant inflation was expected to be slightly below the 
                                                          
8
 CNB website CNB Bank Board monetary decisions 
http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/bank_board_minutes/2007/index.html 
 
64 
 
2% target at the monetary policy horizon. The explanation also refers to the forecast, which projects 
a moderate decline in market interest rates followed by stability and gradual rise in rates since 2011 
(CNB, 2010a). 
Taking into account that until November, 2009 – the CNB did not explicitly provide separate 
sections with explanations of the Board’s decision, receives 0,5 for 2005 – 2009 period. For 2010 it 
receives 1 point.  
 
c) Policy inclination or future policy actions 
In order to detect whether the CNB discloses an explicit policy inclination after every policy 
meeting, the Minutes of the Bank Board meetings from 2005 – 2010 have been analyzed. Since 
2008, the CNB publishes numerically the interest rate path consistent with its forecast. Before 2008, 
this path was commented verbally and compared to the market interest rate outlook. Reading 
through the Minutes, it has to be stated that in general, it is not very easy to delimit where namely 
the CNB discloses future policy actions. In the Minutes of the Bank Board’s meeting from February, 
4 2010, for example, it is stated that “Some of the board members stated that the decision-making on 
monetary policy interest rates was going on in an environment of less uncertainty than in past 
months” (CNB, 2010). Another paragraph that contains somehow several “hidden” indications 
regarding the future policy actions is the one that refers to the spread between interbank market 
interest rates and the monetary policy rate. “The opinion was expressed that the faster-than-
forecasted decline in the spread between short-term interest rates and the monetary policy rate might 
represent an upside risk to inflation going forward” (CNB, 2010). 
In conclusion, the CNB receives 0,5 for 2005 – 2007, when the path was published only 
verbally, and 1 since 2008. 
6.5 Operational Transparency  
 
The following part of the thesis will be concerned with analyzing the operational 
transparency of the NBM and CNB. The operational transparency deals with the implementation of 
the central bank’s policy actions. It refers to the fact whether the central bank discusses the control 
errors in achieving its operating targets and the unexpected macroeconomic disturbances that affect 
the transmission of monetary policy.  
65 
 
National Bank of Moldova  
a) Evaluation of the operating targets’ achievement  
 
The NBM evaluated to what extent its main policy operating target has been achieved 
throughout the period 2005 – 2010. The NBM usually evaluates to what extent its main policy 
operating target have been achieved in the Annual Reports at the end of each year. In 2010, the 
NBM explains whether its monetary policy objectives have been achieved in the monetary policy 
reports.  
Taking into account the findings in the NBM monetary policy documents, NBM is awarded 
1 throughout the whole reference period: 2005 – 2010, as the NBM evaluates to what extent its main 
policy operating targets have been achieved on a regular basis and provides explanations for 
significant deviations from target.   
 
Table 6: Operational Transparency of National Bank of Moldova and Czech National Bank 
Central Bank National Bank of Moldova Czech National Bank 
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Evaluation of 
the operating 
targets’ 
achievement  
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0,5 0,5 
Information on 
(unanticipated) 
macroeconomic 
disturbances 
0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Evaluation of 
the policy 
outcome 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TOTAL 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2 2 2 2 2,5 2,5 
 
 
b) Information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances 
 
Regarding the question of whether the central bank regularly provides information on 
unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission process, it is 
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important to mention that NBM provides explanations regarding past macroeconomic disturbances 
that have affected the achievement of a proposed target. 
In 2005, the NBM explains that due to the positive dynamics of macroeconomic indicators 
and to the intensification of its sterilization operations, the inflation rate was framed within the 
projected limits. Moreover, the NBM explains that the inflation rate in 2005 has been mainly 
affected by the consolidation of domestic demand following remittances’ inflow; population’s wage 
income expansion, as well as rises in fuel prices in the international market.  
 In 2006, the NBM explains that the main factors that lead to an increased inflation trend 
represented the increase of tariffs for energy resources and services. Due to this fact, the reserve 
money also diminished and the NBM explains that this reduction of reserve money was mainly 
determined by the diminishing trend of the net domestic assets of the NBM. It is important to 
mention that for the year 2006, the NBM includes discussion of past forecast errors. Initially, in the 
Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy of the NBM for 2006, limits for inflation were set within the 
8.0 – 10.0%, the GDP was forecasted to grow by 6.5%; the growth of broad money M2 was 
foreseen by 40.0% and the growth of reserve money by 20.0%. However, the central bank 
acknowledges that the evolution of the GDP, the situation of the state balance of payments and the 
prices dynamics differed from the macroeconomic forecast, so the NBM decided to rectify the 
Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy for 2006 and established a limit to the inflation level within 
the 12.0% per year, the increase of reserve money within the ceiling of 2.0%, an increase of broad 
money M2 within the ceiling of 10.0%.  
In 2007, the NBM explains that the increased inflation trend was determined, among other 
factors, by the increase of prices for foodstuff products (mainly for bakery products, meat, dairy 
products, fruit and vegetables) as a result of the adverse weather conditions both in Moldova and its 
neighboring countries. The NBM notes as well that there was a significant increase of prices for 
power resources in the world market; and the inflation registered on products and services with 
regulated prices, including for water supply and sewerage (34.4%), energy supply (31.0%), 
medicines (18.2%), fuel (13.0%), natural gas (10.6%), medical care (10.5%), central heating (6.6%). 
The last factor influencing the increase of the inflation rate is represented by inflationary 
expectations.  
For the year 2008, the NBM explains that in the first period (January – May, 2008), the rapid 
increase of inflation up to 16.9% versus May 2007 was determined by significant prices increase of 
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foodstuff products, as a result of adverse weather conditions from Moldova in 2007, increase of 
prices on energy resources and of tariffs for services. All of these increases were conditioned by the 
evolution of the world prices and money supply increase, as a result of the enlargement of foreign 
currency flows and of the rapid growth of the banking lending.  
In 2009, the NBM notes that the policy transmission process was affected by a slowdown of 
economic activity manifested through reduction of aggregate demand; devaluation of the Moldovan 
leu against currencies of the key economic counterparts of Moldova, especially against Ukrainian 
hrivna; high volume of harvest in 2008 and reduction of agricultural production in 2009; the last 
factor influencing the inflation trend was the rise of prices on fuel internationally and change of 
tariffs on services with regulated prices.  
For 2010, the NBM explains that the increase in core inflation was influenced mostly by the 
developments in the foreign exchange market in the first quarter of 2010, by the increases in indirect 
taxes from the beginning of the year, and by the second-round effects resulting from higher prices of 
services with regulated prices. 
In conclusion, Moldova receives 0,5 for the whole period 2005 – 2010 for the analyzed 
indicator, as it provides information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances that affect the 
policy transmission process, however, only through short-term forecasts and analysis of current 
macroeconomic developments.  
 
c) Evaluation of the policy outcome in light of the Central Bank’s macroeconomic 
objectives 
 
In the 2005 Annual Report, the NBM notes that due to the positive dynamics of 
macroeconomic indicators, intensification of sterilization operations by the NBM, as well as the 
tempering of non-monetary factors’ impact over 2005 permitted to set the inflation rate within the 
initial forecasts for 2005. NBM also notes that in order to ease excessive fluctuations of the official 
exchange rate of the national currency against the US dollar, the NBM intervened in the domestic 
foreign exchange market using US dollar buying/selling operations and reverse swap transactions. 
Due to these interventions, and also through the acquisition of foreign currency surplus, NBM 
consolidated its international reserves and conducted national currency issuance. As a result of these 
actions, reserve money expanded and stayed in line with the initial forecast stipulated in the 
Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy for 2005, the balance of currency in circulation increased, 
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as well as the overall banks’ reserves registered a growing trend. The NBM states as well that the 
amplification of sterilization operations by the NBM in the foreign exchange market constituted the 
main factor that induced the enlargement of reserve money. 
In 2006 Annual Report, the NBM notes that the inflation rate exceeding the limit initially 
projected for 2006 was conditioned by factors, which are not dependent upon the Monetary and 
Foreign Exchange Policy measures and which are beyond the control of the NBM. Also, the NBM 
notes that due to the need for lessening the inflationist impact and within the context of the 
economic situation, the Monetary Policy promoted in 2006 was featured by an enhanced 
restrictiveness degree. In the same year, the NBM writes that under the created conditions, the NBM 
actions were focused on maintaining the balance between the maximum acceptable value of the 
monetary emission and the non-admission of excess fluctuations of the national currency. The NBM 
conducted a strict control over the excess liquidity by larger sterilization operations and by 
increasing the interest rates on monetary policy instruments. As a result, the reserve money 
diminished, and M2 indicator recorded the lowest growth of the last years. 
In 2007, the NBM states that the inflation rate exceeded its initially forecasted limits as a 
consequence of monetary and non-monetary factors, as well as due to inflationary expectations. The 
monetary factor included a monetary issue and namely the fact that reserve money advanced by 
46.4%, as a result of significant acquisitions of foreign currency carried out by the NBM with the 
purpose of avoiding excess fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate of the national currency 
against USD. 
In the 2008 Annual Report, the NBM notes that throughout the year, it increased the base 
rate three times, in order to reverse the inflation trend and to bring inflation in the limit of 10% in 
the annual value. In the same year, the NBM used the required reserves ratio as the monetary policy 
instrument in order to moderate the inflationary expectations and to stimulate the population to 
reduce consumption and encourage savings. It also noted that the inflation level recorded a 
downward trend as a result of certain measures applied jointly by the NBM and the Government of 
Moldova: the intensification of the monetary and foreign exchange policy, the promotion of the 
balanced budget and fiscal policy and the ensuring of the market activity based on the principles of 
free competitiveness. 
In 2009, the NBM stresses that the monetary and foreign exchange policy did not have the 
intended success, due to the fact that its implementation took place in a situation of economic crisis. 
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The failure to achieve the intended monetary policy objectives was due to the significant deviations 
of the development of the macroeconomic indicators, the fierce situation and negative expectations 
of people. Nevertheless, the NBM notes that in these difficult conditions, the NBM managed to 
ensure the relative stability of prices, to maintain the stability of the banking system and to moderate 
the pressures on the foreign exchange market.  
In 2010, in the first Monetary Policy report, the NBM notes that descendent development 
registered by the core inflation was due, among other reasons to the devaluation of currencies in the 
region (especially Ukrainian hrivna and Russian ruble) against the Moldovan leu that has taken 
place before February 2009 as well as in the summer of 2009 which produced positive impact onto 
the commercial mark up gained by the importers. Also, the NBM states that it promoted a moderate 
monetary policy by lowering its base rate and decreasing required reserves ratio pursued. These 
actions pursued the scope of reducing interest rates in the market and offering possibilities of 
lending to real sector of the national economy. Although the main operations of monetary policy 
(short term sterilization as well as injection of liquidity) were done using the NBM base rate the 
signals send by the NBM rates were picked up with a delay by the interbank market of loans – 
deposits and by the government securities market and often failed to influence the short term interest 
rates in these markets. The second Monetary Policy report states that the rates increase to the 
monetary policy instruments initiated by the NBM the beginning of 2010 was motivated by the risk 
of inflation increase in the medium term. In the third Monetary Policy report from 2010, the NBM 
writes that after the decisions taken by the NBM’s CA in the second quarter, the NBM has 
maintained the interest rates at its monetary regulation instruments established at the end of the 
preceding quarter. In the fourth quarter, the NBM notes that during the preceding quarter of 2010, it 
has maintained the conduct of monetary policy prudent by keeping the monetary policy rates at the 
same level and has managed the excess of liquidity from the banking system through sterilization 
operations. Through the decisions of the three meetings of the CA held in the reporting quarter, the 
NBM considered the level of interest rates at its monetary regulation instruments appropriate, 
keeping them the sixth consecutive month at the same level.  
In conclusion, taking into consideration that the NBM provided an evaluation of the policy 
outcome in light of its macroeconomic objectives, accompanied by an explicit account of the 
contribution of monetary policy in meeting the objectives – NBM is awarded 1 point for every year 
from 2005 throughout 2010. 
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Czech National Bank 
a) Evaluation of the operating targets’ achievement  
Regarding the to what extent to which its main policy operating target have been achieved, 
the CNB traditionally did not discuss very explicitly the ability to control the money market interest 
rates, for example.  Even though the CNB has always discussed the evolution of money market 
rates, it started to focus on this issue more explicitly during the recent crisis, as the money market 
premium increased and the issue became more relevant. 
Taking into account that the CNB did not evaluate the operating targets’ achievement before 
the crisis, it receives 0 for 2005 – 2008 and 0,5 for 2009 – 2010, as full information is not disclosed 
in this area. 
b) Information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances 
The CNB provides information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances that affect the 
policy transmission process in its inflation reports for the period 2005 – 2010. It describes the 
monetary conditions and makes reference to the market interest rates. It explains as well why there 
was an increase or decrease in interest rates or why the koruna’s exchange rate against the euro 
appreciated or depreciated.  
Due to the fact that the CNB provides information on unanticipated macroeconomic 
disturbances that affect the policy transmission process and moreover it includes discussions of past 
forecast errors – the CNB receives 1 for 2005 – 2010 for the information on unanticipated 
macroeconomic disturbances indicator.  
c) Evaluation of the policy outcome in light of the Central Bank’s macroeconomic 
objectives 
The Act on the CNB defines the CNB’s primary objective as the maintenance of price 
stability. It also stipulates that without prejudice to this primary objective, the CNB shall support the 
general economic policies of the Government leading to sustainable economic growth (CNB, 
2005a). This means that the CNB should set its main policy instrument, namely interest rates, at a 
level that will maintain inflation at a low and stable level without needlessly slowing, or excessively 
accelerating, the economic growth rate (CNB, 2010d).  
In every Annual Report published by the CNB since 2005, there is a section in the Report, 
where the central bank describes its objectives and their fulfillment. It first refers to monetary policy 
and economic developments. In this section, the CNB analyzes whether the inflation was close to 
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the target, describes the trends of annual consumer price inflation, specifies whether the domestic 
interest rates increased or decreased. It also refers to the rate of growth of the Czech economy and 
compares it to the EU level, describes whether the nominal exchange rate of the koruna against the 
euro appreciated or depreciated and it specifies whether the CNB had to intervene in the  foreign 
exchange market. The CNB also describes the balance of trade and explains why it had to lower, 
increase or leave unchanged the interest rates based on the inflation forecasts. For example, in the 
Annual Report published in 2005, the CNB explains that due to the inflation forecast, the CNB had 
to pursue tighter monetary conditions and had as well to cut the interest rates in three steps by a total 
of 0.75 p.p. to 1.75% during the first quarter of 2005. In the Annual Report from 2009, for example, 
the CNB explains that the monetary policy had to operate in difficult conditions resulting from the 
persisting global financial and economic crisis. Economic activity fell sharply at the beginning of 2009 and 
the CNB describes the trend of the GDP growth in 2009, refers to the increase of consumer price 
inflation and states that it responded by sharply reducing key interest rates starting in August 2008. 
The CNB also writes that due to the unfavorable external demand, the Czech economy registered a 
substantial decline in its performance, when compared to the European Union as a whole. Due to the 
high degree of openness of the Czech economy and its heavy dependence on external demand, 
exports and investment – fell sharply. The CNB also refers to employment and the number of 
vacancies, which fell in 2009. The unemployment, on the other hand, rose. The exchange rate of the 
koruna depreciated and showed considerable volatility, explains CNB, as this depreciation was 
fostered by the problems of some countries in the Central Europe region and by the inability of the 
foreign media and some analysts and financial market participants to appreciate the differences 
between those countries. The CNB also writes that market interest rates continued to be affected by 
a high credit premium, which is the spread between the CNB’s key interest rate and PRIBOR money 
market rates (CNB, 2009).  
In the period 2005 – 2010, the CNB provides even more detailed information on economic 
developments and monetary policy management in the quarterly Inflation Reports in the section 
called “Fulfillment of the inflation target.”   
Regarding the regular evaluation of the policy outcome in light of its macroeconomic 
objectives, the CNB receives 1 for 2005 – 2010, as along with analyzing the macroeconomic 
development in the Czech economy, it also brings an explicit account of the contribution of 
monetary policy in meeting the macroeconomic objectives. 
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6.6 Analysis of the Overall Transparency Index of the NBM and CNB 
Analyzing the table 7 below, that presents the Transparency Indices for the NBM and CNB, 
the general trend is that these two central banks have moved in the direction of greater transparency 
in recent years. The CNB has a stable movement throughout 2005 – 2007, its TI is 13, in 2008 and 
2009 – registers a score of 14 while in 2010 – it embraces full central bank transparency, registering 
the maximum score: 15. The NBM witnesses a gradual increase in its transparency starting since 
2005, when its Transparency Index registered a figure of 4, growing steadily till 2010 and 
registering a score of 8,5 in its overall transparency.  
 
Table 7: Overall Transparency Index of the NBM and CNB 
Central Bank National Bank of Moldova Czech National Bank 
YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Political 
Transparency 
1 1,5 1,5 2,5 2,5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Economic 
Transparency 
0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Procedural 
Transparency 
0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Policy 
Transparency 
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2,5 2,5 3 
Operational 
Transparency 
2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2 2 2 2 2,5 2,5 
TOTAL 4 5 5,5 5,5 6,5 8,5 12 12 12 13,5 14 14,5 
 
The NBM needs considerable improvement at all levels of the Transparency Index, except of 
the Political Transparency. However, areas such as Procedural transparency, Policy transparency 
and Economic transparency – need special attention for improvement from the Moldovan central 
bankers. The NBM needs to improve the quality and amount of the economic data it offers to the 
public. Meanwhile, it has to be more specific on the model of the economy that the NBM employs 
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to construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the internal forecasts that the 
central bank relies on. The NBM registered a significant increase in the Political transparency, as for 
2010 – the last year of analysis of the current thesis, it received the maximum points: 3. The 
Political transparency is the only indicator where NBM received the maximum points. The NBM 
has a lot to learn from the CNB in terms of improving the transparency of its monetary policy 
actions and decisions. 
When comparing the results of the Transparency Index from the current thesis for the years 
2005 and 2006 with the results of Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) with regard to the CNB and the 
NBM measure of transparency – the results from this thesis are to some extent more optimistic for 
the CNB. In the Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) analysis, the Czech Republic obtained a score of 11 
for both 2005 and 2006, while in the current thesis – the Czech Republic has a score of 12 for these 
years. In an earlier version of the same paper, Dincer & Eichengreen (2007) had a score of 11,5 for 
the Czech Republic in 2005. In the Dincer & Eichengreen (2009), the authors have lowered the 
score from 1 to 0,5 at the Economic Transparency and namely at the relevance of the economic data. 
However, it is not clear why the authors lowered the score. In this thesis, the CNB receives full 
score for the Economic Transparency component. In 2006, at the Political Transparency, the CNB 
received full score both in Dincer & Eichengreen (2009), as well as in this thesis. At the Economic 
Transparency, as explained earlier, Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) offered a half score for the 
economic data, while this thesis offered full score. For the Procedural Transparency, Dincer & 
Eichengreen (2009) offer full score for explicit policy rule and for account of policy deliberations. 
This thesis offers as well full score for these components. However, for the disclosure of reaching 
monetary decisions component – Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) offer half score, while this thesis 
offers 0. At the Policy Transparency, Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) offer 1 for announcement of 
policy decisions and 0,5 for explanation of policy decision, trend which is followed as well in the 
current thesis. At the policy inclination component, however, Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) offer a 
score of 0, while the present thesis – 0,5. For the Operational Transparency, Dincer & Eichengreen 
(2009) offer a score of 0 for evaluation of the operating targets’ achievement, as the current thesis 
does, and a score of 0,5 for information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances. This thesis 
offers a score of 1 for this component. For the evaluation of the policy outcome, Dincer & 
Eichengreen (2009) offered a score of 1, as the current thesis did.  
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The NBM, on the other hand registered a constant Transparency Index of 6 for both 2005 
and 2006 in the Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) analysis, while in this thesis – Moldova witnessed a 
lower score, and namely 4 in 2005 and 5 in 2006. Nevertheless, the difference between the results 
obtained by Dincer & Eichengreen (2009) and the current work vis-à -vis the CNB and NBM 
transparency are not very big, which means that the current analysis is accurate. 
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Chapter 7 
7. How surprising are the monetary policy announcements in 
Moldova and in the Czech Republic? 
 
Communication has developed into a key monetary policy instrument (Rosa & Verga, 2006). 
The following section of the thesis will focus on analyzing the effects of each central bank’s policy 
rate decision and monetary policy announcements – on the money market rates.  
Similar analysis has been done by Kotlán & Navrátil (2005). These authors have studied to 
what extent the CNB’s decisions were anticipated by market participants. They state that monetary 
policy is predictable if economic agents expect the monetary policy decisions taken by the central 
bank. A policy is expected when agents understand how the decisions on policy rates are reached 
and are able to predict the sign and size of the interest rate change. The central bank contributes to 
this understanding by having and stating explicit goals, by explaining its decision-making (during 
press conferences or through publishing of minutes) and by informing the public about the data set 
for the decision (Kotlán & Navrátil, 2005).  In a more recent study, Abbassi & Linzert (2011), 
investigate the effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy in steering money market rates during 
the recent financial crisis. Their findings are that market expectations about monetary policy are less 
relevant for money market rates up to 12 months after August 2007 compared to the pre-crisis 
period. 
Regarding the methodology used to analyze the predictability of the two central bank 
decisions, the money market rates (the 2 Weeks and 3 Months CHIBOR and PRIBOR) collected by 
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each central bank from Reuters and published on their official website, are monitored for the period 
from 2005 – 2010. The decisions of the Council of Administration of the NBM and of the CNB’s 
Bank Board are also monitored. In particular, the aim is to observe whether the money market rates 
change after the central banks announce their monetary policy decisions. Kotlán & Navrátil (2005) 
define the “interest rate change” and decide on how big it must be and how quick it must take place. 
They chose 12,5 basic points as the “breakpoint” of no change: if rates move by more than 12,5 b. p. 
it means that more than a half of participants did not expect the given policy move. This thesis will 
follow Kotlán & Navrátil’s (2005) choice for the “breakpoint” of change in the interest rates. The 
second issue Kotlán & Navrátil’s (2005) were concerned with was the length of the “window” to 
look at. The baseline case is based on the difference between rates the day after and the day before 
the Bank Board meeting. Kotlán & Navrátil (2005) state that this short “window” of three days 
minimizes the impact of other factors determining interest rates apart from the Bank Board meeting 
(like foreign developments, release of new data). This is the approach followed in this thesis as well.  
7.1 National Bank of Moldova 
 
The NBM started to publish the money market rates only starting with December, 2005 – 
this means that the analysis will not be able to cover the whole 2005 year, but just the month of 
December. In December 2005, even though the NBM announced that it will maintain the interest 
rates of NBM at the level set on August 25, 2005 – the 2W CHIBOR rate decreased by 15 b. p. after 
the announcement of the NBM’s decision.  
 In 2006
9
 – the NBM announced on March, 30 – that is keeps the same level of the interest 
rates, as announced on August 25, 2005. The 2W CHIBOR rate increased by 11 b. p. and the 3M 
CHIBOR decreased by 10 b. p. On September, 2006 – when even though the NBM has announced 
that it increases its base rate by 0.5 p. p, the markets did no react, as neither the 2W, nor the 3M 
CHIBOR changed before and after the decision announcement. The 3M CHIBOR, for example, 
registered the same value 8 days before the announcement and 8 days after the announcement. It 
was not possible to analyze the reaction of the money market rates after the decision from 
                                                          
9
 In 2006, the NBM has published on its website only the decision announcements from March 30, June 22, September 
28, November 16 and December 1.  
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November 26, as the NBM did not publish what values did the CHIBOR rates register on this 
specific day. 
 In 2007
10
, the decision from August 3 to maintain the NBM base rate at the same level of 
13.5% annually – did not lead to any change on the 2W and 3M CHIBOR rates. Announcing on 
September 26 that it increases the base rate by 2.5 p. p, the markets reacted by an increase of 12 b. p. 
of the 2W CHIBOR and by 19 b. p. of the 3M CHIBOR rate after the announcement decision. On 
November 1, the NBM announced that it maintains the interest rates at the level established on 
September 26, 2007 – and the markets seemed to expect such a decision, as the 2W and 3M 
CHIBOR did not change before or after the decision.  
 In 2008
11
, after the decisions from January 31 and March 13, the money market rates did not 
register any change before and after the decision announcement. On May, 23 2008 – the NBM’s CA 
decided to increase by 1.5 p. p. the base rate applied on the main monetary policy operations of the 
National Bank. Respectively, the 2W rate remained unchanged, while the 3M CHIBOR increased by 
13 b. p. after the decision announcement. Before the decision from November 27, when the NBM 
reduced the base rate applied on the main monetary policy operations by 1.5 p. p. – the 2W 
CHIBOR decreased by 21 b. p., while the 3M CHIBOR increased by 15 b. p. On December 18, 
2008 – the NBM announced a decrease in the base rate by 1.5 p.p. and the money market rates 
remained unchanged. An explanation of the fact that in the case of NBM, there is a high level of 
spread between the money market rates and the policy rates can be the idea that the monetary policy 
cannot effectively steer short term money market rates and the NBM encounters difficulties in 
managing the market’s expectations. 
 In 2009
12
 – the decision from February 5, announced a decrease in the base rate by 
1.5 p. p. The 2W and 3M CHIBOR decreased by 19 b. p. and 22 b. p. respectively. The decisions 
from June 18 and August 7 – did not cause any fluctuations on the money market rates. In July – 
there was the most significant reaction of the market since December 2005, the starting point of this 
analysis. After the NBM announcement that it decreases its base rate by 1 p. p., the 2W CHIBOR 
                                                          
10
 In 2007, the NBM has published on its website only the decision announcements from August 3, September 28 and 
November 1  
11
 In 2008, the NBM has published only the decisions from January 31, March 13, May 30, November 27 and December 
18. 
12
 In 2009, the NBM published the decisions from February 5, June 19, July 17, August 7 and September 8  
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decreased by 141 b. p. This means that the markets were very surprised by the decision and the 
market rate registered such a jump downward. The 3M CHIBOR decreased by 31 b. p. The decision 
from September 8 – lead as well to a significant surprise on the market, as the 2W CHIBOR 
decreased by 78 b. p. on the day of the decision announcement and by 114 b. p. the next day, after 
the decision was announced. The 3M CHIBOR decreased after the decision announcement by 121 b. 
p. An explanation of these substantial money market interest rate changes after the policy 
announcements can be the fact that the NBM’s communication practices do not fulfill the 
assumptions stated by Kotlán & Navrátil (2005) for the monetary policy to be predictable. As the TI 
for the NBM depicts, the NBM does not always contribute to the economic agents’ understanding 
on how the decisions on policy rates are reached or on their ability to predict the sign and size of the 
interest rate change. Even though the NBM has explicit goals, it fails to explain its decision-making 
(during press conferences or through publishing of minutes) and by informing the public about the 
data set for the decision through an economic forecast.  
 In 2010 – the decision announced on January 28 to increase the NBM base rate – did not 
lead to a significant change to the 2W CHIBOR, which decreased only by 1 b. p. The 3M CHIBOR 
decreased by 10 b. p. On February 25, when the NBM announced that it maintains the base rate on 
the main short-term monetary policy operations at the level of 6% per year – lead to no fluctuations 
of the 2W CHIBOR and to a decrease of the 3M CHIBOR by 9 b. p. The decision from March 26, to 
increase the base rate applied to the main monetary policy operations on short term by 1 p. p. – lead 
to an increase of the 2W and of the 3M CHIBOR by 11 b. p. and 7 b. p. respectively after the 
decision announcement. On May, 26 – the NBM announced that it maintains the base rate at the 
same level announced on April 29. The markets expected this decision and did not react in surprise, 
as more days (9 for 2W and 12 for 3M) after the decision was taken – both the 2W and the 3M 
CHIBOR kept the same value. The decision from June 24, when the NBM announced that it 
maintains the same level of 7 % annually of the base rate, the markets reacted by an increase in the 
2W CHIBOR by 10 b. p. and to a decrease in the 3M CHBIR by 17 b. p. After the decisions from 
July 29, August 26, September 30, October 28, November 25 and December 30 – the money market 
rates (2W and 3M CHIBOR) did not register significant changes in their values: nor before the 
decision, neither after it.  
In conclusion, there are two aspects that need to be mentioned. First, after monitoring the 
effects of the NBM’s policy decision announcements on the money market rates fluctuations before 
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and after the decision announcement, it can be stated in some cases, the NBM registered substantial 
money market interest rate changes after the policy announcements. Fluctuations of 141 b. p. in the 
value of the 2W or of 121 b. p. in the 3M CHIBOR – are an evidence of this fact. As stated before, 
an explanation of these substantial changes might be the fact that the NBM is not always managing 
at communicating with the public the way it conducts its monetary policy and as a result, the public 
reacts in surprise when the NBM announces its policy rate decisions. Second, by analyzing the 
Graph 1 picturing the changes of the policy decisions and the responses of the short-term markets 
rates – an observed trend is how little the money market rates respond to the policy rate changes 
(except for the year 2009). This could mean that the monetary policy transmission through the 
money market does not work well and given the high level of spread between the money market 
rates and the policy 
rates, which is 
present in Moldova (unlike in the Czech Republic), this explanation may be plausible. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own computations 
7.2 Czech National Bank  
  
For the CNB, the money market information and the yearly history of PRIBOR 2W and 3M 
rates, published on the CNB website – have been analyzed. The CNB has published information on 
the money market rates since 1992, thus there is information for 2005 – 2010 period. Also, an 
Figure 3. NBM's Money Market Rates 2005 - 2010 
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important input for this analysis represented the Minutes of the CNB’s Bank Board published on the 
CNB’s website. 
In January 2005, after the CNB announced that it lowers the 2W repo-rate and the Lombard 
rate, the markets reacted by a reduction in the 2W PRIBOR rate by 34 b. p., while the 3M PRIBOR 
decreased by 20 b. p. The decision from April 28 to lower the two-week repo rate, the discount rate 
and the Lombard rate by 0.25 p.p. – lead to a decrease in the 2W PRIBOR by 24 b.p., while the 3M 
PRIBOR decreased by 23 b. p. On May 26, 2005 – the CNB decided to maintain the same level of 
the 2W repo-rate. Looking at the behavior of the markets – they were not very surprised by this 
decision, as the 2W and 3M PRIBOR decreased only by 1 b. p. on the day of decision 
announcement, as compared to the day before. The decisions from February 24, March 31, June 30, 
July 28, August 25, September 29, October 27, November 24 and December 22 – did not cause 
significant changes in the 2W and 3M PRIBOR rates. 
In January, 2006 – after he CNB announced that it maintains the same level of the 2 weeks 
repo-rate, the markets reacted slightly by a decrease in the 3M PRIBOR by 4 b. p. on the day of the 
decision announcement, as compared to the day before. The decision from February 23 to leave the 
two-week repo rate unchanged at 2%, lead to an increase in the 2W PRIBOR by 9 b.p. and in the 
3M PRIBOR by 11 b. p. The decisions from March 30, April 27, May 25, June 29, July 27, August 
31, October 26, November 30, December 20 – did not lead to significant changes if the 2W and 3M 
PRIBOR rates. On September 27, when the CNB decided to raise the two-week repo rate by 0.25 
p.p. – the PRIBOR 2W reacted by a slight increase on the next day by 8 b. p.  
In 2007, after the CNB Board meetings and announcements from January 27, March 1, 
March 29, May 31, June 28, September 27, October 25 and December 19 – the markets did not 
change the 2W and 3M PRIBOR rates, so there was no sign of surprise. After the decision from 
April 26 – to leave the two-weeks repo-rate unchanged, only the 3M PRIBOR rate reacted by a 
slight increase of 3 b. p.  The decision from July 26, where the CNB announced that it increases its 
two-week repo rate by 0.25 p.p. – the 2W PRIBOR remained unchanged, while the 3M PRIBOR 
decreased by 6 b. p. After the decision from August 30, when the CNB decided that it increases the 
two-week repo rate by 0.25 p. p. – the markets’ reaction was more visible, as the 2W PRIBOR 
increased by 20 b. p. on the next day. After the same decision, the 3M PRIBOR increased by 6 b. p. 
The decision from November 29 had as well a more visible impact on the money market rates. After 
the decision to increase the CNB two-week repo rate by 0.25 p.p. – the 2W PRIBOR rate increased 
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by 5 b. p. from November 28 – November 29 and then again by 6 b. p. on November 30. The 3M 
PRIBOR rate increased by 8 b. p. from November 28 until November 29, the day of the decision 
announcement.  
In 2008, after the CNB Board meetings and announcements from March 26, May 7, June 26 
– the markets did not register changes in the 2W and 3M PRIBOR rates. The CNB Board 
announcement from February 7 – has caused the 2W PRIBOR rate to increase by 8 b. p.: with 6 b. p. 
on the day of the decision announcement and with 2 b. p. after the decision announcement. The 3M 
PRIBOR rate did not register a significant change. The decision from August 7 had as well a certain 
impact on the money market rates – as the 2W PRIBOR decreased by 16 b. p. The decision from 
September 25 – lead to an increase of the 2W and 3M PRIBOR rates by 4 b. p. and 7 b. p. 
respectively. The decision from November 6, when the CNB announced that it will lower the two-
week repo rate by 0.75 p.p. – significantly surprised the markets, as the 2W PRIBOR rate decrease 
by 57 b. p. after the decision announcement. The 3M PRIBOR decreased as well by 22 b. p. after the 
decision announcement. On December 17, when the CNB announced that it lowers the two-week 
repo rate by 0.50 p. p. – the markets reacted again, by a decrease in the 2W PRIBOR by 10 b. p. on 
the day of announcement and by 15 b. p. the next day, after the decision announcement. The 3M 
PRIBOR decreased as well by 20 b. p. after the decision was made public.  
After the decision from February 5, 2009 – when the CNB announced that it lowers the two-
week repo rate by 0.50 p.p. – the markets reacted again by an increase in the 2W PRIBOR by 16 b. 
p. and by a decrease in the 3M PRIBOR of 13 b. p. The decision from May 7, when the CNB 
decided to lower the two-week repo rate by 0.25 p.p. – lead to a reduction of the 2W PRIBOR by 17 
b. p., and of the 3M PRIBOR by 14 b. p. after the decision announcement. After the decision from 
August 6, when the CNB again announced that it lowers its two-week repo rate by 0.25 p. p., the 
2W PRIBOR decreased by 21 b. p. after the decision announcement, while the 3M PRIBOR 
decreased by 13 b. p. After the CNB announced on December 16 that it lowers the two-week repo 
rate by 0.25 p. p., the markets reacted by an increase in the 2W and in the 3M PRIBOR by 18 b. p. 
and 15 b. p. respectively. The decisions from March 26, June 25, September 24 and November 5 – 
did not register an impact on the money market rates.   
In 2010, the CNB decisions from February 4, March 25, June 23, August 5, September 23, 
November 4 and December 22 – did not have a significant impact on the money market rates 
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considered in this thesis. After announcing on May 6 that it lowers the two-week repo rate by 0.25 p. 
p. – the 2W and the 3M PRIBOR decreased by 18 b. p. and by 12 b. p. respectively.   
In conclusion, the changes of the 2W and 3M PRIBOR after monetary policy 
announcements were smaller in comparison to the 2W and 3M CHIBOR, in the analyzed period. 
This means that the market is not that surprised when the CNB’s Bank Board announces its policy 
rate decisions. The number of CNB’s surprises has declined over time. Holub (2008) states that the 
CNB surprised the market on a few occasions and it typically prefers to act when deemed necessary. 
This idea is supported by the Graph 2 picturing the CNB’s money market rates.  The CNB is Thus, 
the CNB is more transparent and the markets can anticipate a policy rate decision, the fluctuations of 
the money market rates being lower.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own computations 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CNB's Money Market Rates 2005 - 2010 
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Chapter 8 
8. Improving NBM’s communication practices based on the CNB 
experience 
Communication plays an important role in explaining to the public the instruments and the 
goals of the monetary policy, as well as the reasons behind the decisions made by the authorities 
(Winkler, 2000). The following section of the thesis will suggest some recommendations, based on 
the Czech experience, of how NBM should improve its communication practices, in order to further 
increase its transparency, clarity and predictability of monetary policy.  
Since the CNB has become one of the most progressive institutions concerning the openness 
of monetary policy (Böhm et al., 2009), the recommendations for the NBM are based on the CNB. 
To improve its Economic Transparency, the NBM should consider presenting on a quarterly 
basis the five variables important for the conduct of monetary policy: money supply, inflation, GDP, 
unemployment rate and capacity utilization. In 2010, the NBM published the information on GDP, 
unemployment rate, inflation and money supply; however the capacity utilization variable is 
missing. To the same extent, the NBM should put more effort into making public its methodological 
approach it uses when conducting the monetary policy. The forecasting equations for the key 
variables or models should be also disclosed to the public. In order to improve its Procedural 
Transparency, the NBM should follow the CNB’s experience and give a comprehensive account of 
policy deliberations within a reasonable amount of time. This implies that the NBM should provide 
comprehensive minutes from the meetings of its CA. Another recommendation would be for the 
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NBM to disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating instrument was reached, by 
providing the individual voting records. At this stage, however, it might be as well enough to start 
publishing the voting ratio.  
In order for the NBM to improve its Policy Transparency, it should disclose an explicit 
policy inclination after every policy meeting or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions, 
in order to provide the public with a basis for its expectations formation.  
Along with the fact that the NBM publishes press releases after the meetings of the Council 
of Administration, the NBM could also organize press conferences after each meeting. During the 
press conference, the Governor would explain the main monetary policy decision and the 
implications of the decision on the economy. This practice is being used by the CNB – after each 
meeting of the Bank’s Board, the Governor organizes a press conference and addresses to the public, 
announcing a brief digest of the information which the Bank Board based its discussion on, and a 
list of the risks pertaining to the current forecast according to the Bank Board members. Another 
important practice used by the CNB, which could be also useful to the NBM – is the publishing of 
the video and audio versions of the press conference on the central bank’s web site, along with a 
power point presentation – where the central bankers summarize the policy decisions and the 
economic forecasts. 
Another gap in the NBM’s communication practices is the fact that sometimes it publishes 
the press releases on the monetary policy decisions several days after the meeting of the CA. In 
March 2008, the CA took the policy rate decision at the meeting from May 23; however the press 
release announcing the decision was published on May 30, with a gap of 7 days. In September, 2009 
– the CA gathered for the monthly meeting on September 3, while the policy rate decision was 
announced on September 8, with a gap of 5 days. In 2010, there was an improvement in this 
practice: the press release started to be published on the day when the decision was taken. An 
exception was only the month of March, when the CA held its meeting on March 25; however the 
press release was published on March 26. The fact that the press releases are published later than the 
decision was taken, confuses markets and may not lead to the desired effect of the policy rate 
decision. The NBM could as well improve its practice of announcing the policy decisions, following 
the CNB’s practice. On the CNB’s website, at the section “CNB Board Decisions”, the central bank 
announces the concrete time when the decision is going to be announced: “The Bank Board’s 
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interest rate decision is published after the end of monetary policy meeting, at 1 p.m. This is 
followed by a press conference at 2.30 p.m. The presentation given at the press conference is made 
available immediately after the press conference, usually at around 3 p.m. Since May 2007 audio 
recordings and since December 2009 also videos from the press conference have been made 
available on the CNB website about one hour after the press conference. The minutes of the 
meeting, reflecting the Bank Board members’ discussion, are usually published 8 days later. 
Detailed transcripts of the monetary Bank Board meetings and the inputs for the Bank Board’s 
decisions on monetary issues (the Situation Report on Economic and Monetary Developments and 
the Monetary Policy Recommendations) are published six years later.”13 
Another recommendation is directed to improve the NBM’s website. Rather than publishing 
all the documents as an attachment, the information would be more accessible if it was directly 
published on the site, without the need of the user to download the file on the computer. It would be 
also very useful to have a specific section in the NBM’s website devoted to the media and public 
relations. Another important practice observed on the CNB’s website is that it regularly gathers all 
the media articles, TV or audio reportages featuring the CNB. This could be a good practice for the 
NBM as well. Also, while working on the thesis, no contact person responsible for the media and 
public relations has been discovered on the website. A good start in improving NBM’s 
communication practices – would be namely publishing the name and contact information of the 
spokesperson.     
Finally, a minor recommendation to the NBM inspired from the CNB’s experience is 
organizing a NBM “Open Day” event. The CNB organizes this occasionally for the general public. 
From 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., the visitors have the opportunity to visit otherwise inaccessible areas of the 
Czech National Bank. The public is guided through a route within the CNB’s headquarters, 
providing a comprehensive picture of monetary policy decision-making. In 2010, the visitors had as 
well the chance to see the conference room in which the Bank Board decides interest rates, and even 
the door of the Governor’s office was open for the visitors.  Even if the NBM has its museum, where 
the public can see commemorative coins and find out historical data about the Moldovan Leu, it 
                                                          
13
 CNB website, CNB Board Decisions http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/bank_board_minutes/ 
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could as well “import” the practice of organizing an “Open Day” event, in order to bring the public 
closer and increase the awareness about its day to day activity. 
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Chapter 9 
9. Concluding Remarks 
 
The old paradigm of central banking secrecy has been largely replaced by one of openness 
(Jeanneau, 2009). The increasing literature on central bank communication reveals the fact that 
central banks around the world have put a lot of effort in recent years to improve their 
communication practices when explaining their decisions relating to the monetary policy. The trend 
toward greater central bank autonomy (Jeanneau, 2009) encouraged the tendency of public to 
demand more transparency, so as to make the central banks more accountable for their actions and 
decisions. (Eijffinger & Geraats, 2005). 
The CNB’s success in improving its transparency and predictability of monetary policy was 
taken as an example in this thesis, in order to compare the CNB’s communication practices with the 
ones of the NBM and help the National Bank of Moldova in its efforts to improve its 
communication strategy.  
In evaluating the transparency of monetary policy of the two central banks, a detailed 
analysis of various monetary documents and actual information disclosure has been done and a 
transparency index for both countries has been constructed. The transparency index revealed that 
both central banks have moved in the direction of greater transparency in the period 2005 – 2010. 
The CNB achieved in 2010 almost full central bank transparency. The NBM registered a gradual 
increase in its transparency since 2005 until 2010 and needs to put more effort into improving the 
quality and amount of the economic data it offers to the public and it has to be more specific on the 
model of the economy that it employs when constructing economic forecasts.   
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Analyzing how surprising are the monetary policy decisions in the two countries based on 
how much do short-term money market rates change after the decision’s announcement, it has been 
found that CNB achieves a lower degree of market surprises related to its monetary policy decisions. 
The NBM situation is rather unclear, as the money market rates respond little to the policy rate 
changes (except of the year 2009). An explanation could be that due to the high level of spread 
between the money market rates and the policy rates, the monetary policy transmission through the 
money market does not work well.  
Finally, based on the Czech experience, several recommendations have been suggested to the 
NBM, in order to support it in its endeavor to further increase the monetary policy transparency, 
clarity and predictability. Among these recommendations are: presenting on a quarterly basis the 
five variables important for the conduct of monetary policy, making public its methodological 
approach it uses when conducting the monetary policy, giving a comprehensive account of policy 
deliberations within a reasonable amount of time, organizing press conferences after each monetary 
policy meeting, be more prompt when announcing the policy rate decisions, and suggestions to 
improve the readability and accessibility of the official web site. 
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Appendix 
 
Transparency Index Questionnaire  
 
This questionnaire contains the exact formulation of the central bank transparency index, 
based on Dincer & Eichengreen (2009). The Transparency Index is the sum of the scores for the 
answers to the fifteen questions below (min = 0, max = 15). 
 
1. Political Transparency 
 
Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a formal statement 
of objectives, including an explicit prioritization in case of multiple goals, a quantification of the 
primary objective(s), and explicit institutional arrangements.  
 
a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit 
prioritization in case of multiple objectives? 
 
No formal objective(s) = 0. 
Multiple objectives without prioritization = 1/2. 
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1. 
 
b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)? 
 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
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c) Are there explicit institutional arrangements or contracts between the monetary authorities 
and the government? 
 
No central bank, contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0. 
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2. 
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract (although 
possibly subject to an explicit override procedure) = 1. 
 
2. Economic Transparency 
 
Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary policy. This 
includes economic data, the model of the economy that the central bank employs to construct 
forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the internal forecasts (model based or 
judgmental) that the central bank relies on.  
 
a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly available? 
The focus is on the release of data for the following five variables: money supply, inflation, 
GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization. 
 
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0. 
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2. 
Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1. 
 
b) Does the central bank disclose the formal macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy 
analysis? 
 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
 
c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts? 
 
No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0. 
Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than quarterly 
frequency = 1/2. 
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the medium term (one 
to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy instrument (conditional or 
unconditional forecasts) = 1. 
 
3. Procedural Transparency 
 
Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. It involves an explicit 
monetary policy rule or strategy that describes the monetary policy framework, an account of policy 
deliberations and how the policy decision was reached. 
 
a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its monetary 
policy framework?  
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No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
 
b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or explanations 
in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time? 
 
No, or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or 
explanations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward and 
forward-looking arguments = 1. 
 
c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating 
instrument or target was reached? 
 
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2. 
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1. 
 
4. Policy Transparency 
 
Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions. In addition, it includes an 
explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of likely future policy 
actions. 
 
a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target promptly 
announced? 
 
No, or after a significant lag = 0. 
Yes, at the latest on the day of implementation = 1. 
 
b)  Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions? 
 
No = 0. 
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1. 
 
c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting or an 
explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)? 
 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
 
5. Operational Transparency 
 
Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s policy actions. It 
involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating targets and (unanticipated) 
macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary policy. Furthermore, the 
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evaluation of the macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy in light of its objectives is included 
here as well. 
 
a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating targets (if 
any) have been achieved? 
 
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations = 1/2. 
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect control 
over main operating instrument/target = 1. 
 
b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic 
disturbances that affect the policy transmission process? 
 
No, or not very often = 0. 
Yes, but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic 
developments (at least quarterly) = 1/2. 
Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1. 
 
c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light of its 
macroeconomic objectives? 
 
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes, but superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting the 
objectives = 1. 
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Table 8: Change in NBM’s policy rates and the corresponding changes in the 2W and 2M CHIBOR 
the day after and before the policy decision announcement 
Date Change in policy rate 
Change in 2W 
CHIBOR 
Change in 3M 
CHIBOR 
29.12.2005 0% -0,15% 0% 
06.03.2006 0% 0% 0% 
22.05.2006 0% 0,19% 0% 
28.09.2006 0,50% 0% 0% 
16.11.2006 1,10% 0% 0% 
01.12.2006 0,50% 0% 0% 
03.08.2007 0% 0% 0% 
28.09.2007 2,50% 0,69% 0,78% 
01.11.2007 0% 0% 0% 
31.01.2008 0% -0,03% 0% 
13.03.2008 1% 0% 0% 
30.05.2008 1,50% 0% 0,18% 
26.09.2008 -1,50% 0% 0,03% 
27.11.2008 -1,50% -0,21% 0,15% 
18.12.2008 -1,50% 0% 0% 
05.02.2009 -1,50% -0,19% -0,22% 
18.06.2009 -1% 0% 0% 
17.07.2009 -1% -1,45% -0,06% 
07.08.2009 -1% -0,09% -0,59% 
08.09.2009 -2% -1,92% -1,21% 
28.01.2010 1% -0,46% -0,26% 
25.02.2010 0% 0,07% -0,09% 
26.03.2010 1% 0,11% 0,07% 
29.04.2010 0% 0,17% 0% 
26.05.2010 0% 0% 0% 
24.06.2010 0% 0,10% -0,17% 
29.07.2010 0% 0% 0% 
26.08.2010 0% -0,02 -0,03% 
30.09.2010 0% 0% 0% 
28.10.2010 0% 0% 0% 
25.11.2010 0% 0,01% 0,02% 
30.12.2010 1% 0,08% 0,02% 
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Table 9: Change in CNB’s policy rates and the corresponding changes in the 2W and 2M PRIBOR 
the day after and before the policy decision announcement 
Date Change in policy rate 
Change in 2W 
PRIBOR 
Change in 3M 
PRIBOR 
27.Jan.2005 -0,25% -0,24% -0,25% 
24.Feb.2005 0% 0% -0,01% 
31.Mar.2005 -0,25% -0,04% -0,02% 
28.Apr.2005 -0,25% -0,25% -0,23% 
26.May.2005  0% -0,01% -0,01% 
30.Jun.2005 0% 0% 0% 
28.Jul.2005 0% 0% 0% 
25.Aug.2005 0% 0% 0% 
29.Sep.2005 0% 0% 0% 
27.Oct.2005 0,25% 0,26% 0,24% 
24.Nov.2005 0% 0% -0,04% 
22.Dec.2005 0% 0% 0% 
26.Jan.2006 0% -0,01% -0,05% 
23.Feb.2006 0% -0,01% -0,01% 
30.Mar.2006 0% 0% 0% 
26.Apr.2006 0% 0,01% 0,02% 
25.May.2006 0% 0% -0,01% 
29.Jun.2006 0% -0,02% -0,02% 
27.Jul.2006 0,25% 0,10% 0,04% 
31.Aug.2006 0% 0% 0% 
27.Sep.2006 0,25% 0,12% 0,04% 
26.Oct.2006 0% 0% 0,01% 
30.Nov.2006 0% 0% -0,01% 
20.Dec.2006 0% 0% -0,02% 
25.Jan.2007 0% 0% 0% 
01.Mar.2007 0% 0% -0,01% 
29.Mar.2007 0% 0% 0% 
26.Apr.2007 0% 0,01% 0,03% 
31.May.2007 0,25% 0,09% 0,01% 
28.Jun.2007 0% 0% 0,03% 
26.Jul.2007 0,25% 0,01% 0,07% 
30.Aug.2007 0,25% 0,22% 0,06% 
27.Sep.2007 0% 0% 0,01% 
25.Oct.2007 0% 0% 0% 
29.Nov.2007 0,25% 0,11% 0,09% 
19.Dec.2007 0% 0,13% 0,01% 
07.Feb.2008 0,25% 0,08% -0,02% 
26.Mar.2008 0% 0,03% -0,01% 
07.May.2008 0% 0% 0% 
26.Jun.2008 0% 0,01% 0% 
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07.Aug.2008 -0,25% -0,16% -0,10% 
25.Sep.2008 0% 0,05% 0,08% 
06.Nov.2008 -0,75% -0,61% -0,21% 
17.Dec.2008 -0,50% -0,25% -0,22% 
05.Feb.2009 -0,50% -0,23% -0,16% 
26.Mar.2009 0% -0,01% -0,02% 
07.May.2009 -0,25% -0,18% -0,20% 
25.Jun.2009 0% 0,01% -0,02% 
06.Aug.2009 -0,25% -0,21% -0,14% 
24.Sep.2009 0% -0,02% 0,01% 
05.Nov.2009 0% -0,01% 0,01% 
16.Dec.2009 -0,25% -0,18% -0,15% 
04.Feb.2010 0% 0,01% 0% 
25.Mar.2010 0% -0,01% -0,01% 
06.May.2010 -0,25% -0,18% -0,12% 
23.Jun.2010 0% 0% 0% 
05.Aug.2010 0% 0% 0% 
23.Sep.2010 0% 0% 0% 
04.Nov.2010 0% 0% 0,01% 
22.Dec.2010 0% -0,03% 0% 
 
 
